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I 
MARGINS 
The Tribes of 
Europe 
In a recent speech in Pittsburgh, 
Martin Walker, the London 
Gurdian's US correspondent, 
pointed to Yugoslavia and descrlbed 
"'the tribes of Europe"' as the most 
bloodthinty, vicious groups on the 
planet. If allowed, he said, they 
would plunge us into another world 
cataclysm. 
At the same time, riots were taking 
place in Brooklyn, New York, after a 
seven-year-old black boy had been 
nm down by a car driven by a mem-
ber of the local Hassidic Jewish oom-
munity. A travelling Hassidic 
rabbinical student was stabbed to 
death in retaliation. It was an extraor-
dinary and tragic renm of Spike Lee's 
1990 film Straight out of Brooklyn, al-
beit with Hassidic Jews substituting 
for Italians. 
The events of the past weeks in the 
Soviet Union have also displayed the 
fragility of unions involving minority 
peoples. The great quest for the 
republics of the USSR is to develop a 
better form of oo-operation in which 
~e sovereign rights of citizens, races 
and communities are upheld. As we 
move towards a new century in which 
many federations and states will have 
to redefine themselves anew, 
foremost among the issues to be 
resolved are those involving the 
recognition of ethnic and racial 
groups and indigenous peoples. 
In the 'Soviet Union' of the future the 
concept of federation will have to be 
reinvented. Uke Marx and Engels, the 
founders of the Soviet Union were 
arch opponents of federalism. Lenin, 
in turn, advocated not only a unitary 
state but a unitary world in which 
humankind came together as a single, 
supranational proletarian entity. For 
them, nationalities and republics 
were an important but temporary 
obstacle on the road to proletarian 
solidarity. 
Lenin opposed the extreme centralis-
ing tendencies of his chief 
nationalities' theoretician, Stalin. But 
Lenin's support for federalism was 
tactical; he saw federalism as a tem-
porary measure that would be sup-
planted as time went on. 
The treatment of ethnic identity and 
republican ambitions by even the 
most liberal communists after Stalin 
has revolved around the illusion that 
federalism would ultimately be of no 
significance. There are over 120 ethnic 
groups in the Soviet Union. Stalin's 
centralist policies aggravated ten-
sions, creating a seething cauldron of 
republican, racial and minority 
grievances that has never been ade-
quately dealt with. 
Even Mikhail Gorbachev had some 
experiences from which he should 
have learned. In the early period of 
perestroika he appointed an ethnic 
Russian, Gennadii Kolbin, as first 
secretary of the Kazakhstan Com-
munist Party-a decision resulting in 
riots in Alma Ata in December 1986. 
The original Gorbachev politburo 
and secretariat contained only one 
non-Slav, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
whose departure in December 1990 
was an early warning of the events 
that have recently taken place. Only 
in the latter part of 1990 were ethnic 
and minority representatives-a Kir-
ghiz, a Latvian and an Armenian 
among them-included in the 
Presidential Council 
The ascendancy of Boris Yeltsin and 
his immediate demand that a 
majority of ethnic Russians be ap-
pointed to the Union's central cabinet 
will do nothing to accommodate a 
more co-operative set of power shar-
ing arrangements. 
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Most republics have substantial 
minority populations. They have yet 
to demonstrate that they are any bet-
ter than were the federal authorities at 
respecting minority rights. Geor-
gians, for example, have been as in-
tolerant of their minority Ossetians as 
Russians have been of Georgians. On 
top of this, in many cases there is no 
economic glue to weld minorities and 
republics together other than through 
common grievances and opposition 
to Russia and the union. 
In the South Pacific these problems of 
developing concepts of federation 
and nationhood that can accom-
modate the rights of ethnic groups 
and native peoples seem particularly 
pertinent. Australia has yet to 
develop an individual bill of rights. 
More meaningful treaties and agree-
ments with the native peoples of 
Australia and New Zealand must also 
be developed. Papua New Guinea's 
Bougainville crisis also illustrates that 
the rights of indigenous people are 
not well enough protected under the 
nation state model of parliamentary 
democracy. 
In Fiji, the feudal village chief system 
has resulted in the suppression of the 
country's ethnic minority, the over· 
throw of parliamentary democracy 
and a crackdown on the parliamen· 
tary labour party and trade unions. In 
the near future, when Colonel 
Rabuka's rule of force gives way, 
some compromise between in· 
digenous rights, democracy and in· 
dividual freedoms will have to be 
devised. 
One of the great lessons of the late 
20th century is that people of com· 
mon racial and ethnic backgrounds 
seem to perceive themselves as 
having closer bonds and more in com-
mon with each other than those with 
whom they may be linked ideologi-
cally. Or, at least, it should be said race 
and ethnicity have supplanted politi· 
cal strategy as the basis for ideological 
meaning. We seem to have passed 
through an era of political ideology to 
an era of racial and ethnic solidarity. 
PETER BOTSMAN, the executive 
director of the EvaH Foundation, il on 
leave in New York. 
PROFILE 
Bishop Spong 
Biahop John Shelby Spong, virtually 
anknown in this country a year ago, 
had gained widespread notoriety 
with Australians by July this year, 
J 
mostly for his 'controversial' state-
ment• on the relations between 
bomotexual people and the Church. 
J .. 
f 
I 
Spong was born and raised in the 
strong fundamentalist traditions of 
the Southern States but broke with 
them to partidpate in the dvil rights 
movement during the 60s. He is now 
a bishop in the Episropal (Anglican) 
Church in the United States. Under 
his leadership, the Diooose of Newark 
has taken a leading role in reoognising 
the contribution of homosexual 
women and men to the life of that 
church. 
Spong has published twelve books 
and numerous articles on contem-
porary sodal and theological issues. 
Judging by his two most recent books 
(the only two available in Australia), 
Spong is not coming up with any real-
ly new biblical or theological direc-
tions-he seems to be blithely 
unaware of textual theory and prac-
tice since the early 70s. But he is clear-
ly familiar with, and has talcen up, a 
biblical and theological position 
which springs up every now and then 
like a Nightmllre on Elm Street sequel. 
Spong's work is significant to the 
Australian context in three aspects. 
FllStly, he strenuously criticises the 
exclusiveness of many churches. This 
is the underlying polemic of Living in 
Sin (1988), the book which first drew 
Spong to the attention of Australian 
Christians. The subtitle of the book, A 
Bishop Rdhinks Humlln Sexuality, is 
perhaps an overstatement, but 
Spong's outspokenness on sexual 
prejudices and responsibilities repre-
sents a radical step in the mainstream 
churches. 
Spong urges church people to reoog-
nise that the people they marginalise 
or plainly exclude from 'The Church' 
are often, themselves, devoted to the 
churches. And taking a step further, 
he insists that homosexual marriages, 
sexually active pre-marriage partner-
ships, divorce and sexually active 
partnerships involving post-married 
people (divorcees, widows and 
widowers) should not merely be ac-
knowledged but, in some cases, 
blessed by churches. 
Spong's point is that 'churchy' people 
arenottheonlypeoplewhodoor'are' 
good. Rather, he claims, God creates 
and blesses all people. At their best, 
the churches are a representation of 
this. At their worst, they behave as 
moral (too often defined in exclusive-
ly sexual categories) police in a sea of 
wickedness. Thankfully, the Church 
in toto can never be reduced to such 
mean spiritedness. The people of the 
Church are too diverse and its history 
of dissent too strong. 
Secondly, he senses the urgency of the 
need for ordinary church people to 
win back their churches. Knowledge 
may be power-if you are 
knowledgeable. But ignorance can 
give a person a lot of leverage. In the 
US, Spong laments, it is appallingly 
apparent that ordinary people, espe-
cially people outside the church, 
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simply do not know that reasonable 
alternatives to fundamentalism exist. 
Spong writes in fierce opposition to 
the fundamentalist leaders who 
benefit from this state of affairs. Res-
cuing tM Bibk from Fundilmentalism, 
his most recent book, is an attempt to 
disseminate Bible scholarship beyond 
seminaries and theological institu-
tions to "citizens of the modem 
world". 
In this mel~, Spong serves more as a 
Promethean figure than as a 
trailblazer. To become a Spongian 
would miss the point-Spong is steal-
ing fire and bringing it to ordinary 
people, not illuminating a way for-
ward by the brilliance of his own 
ideas. 
Yet, whatever Spong's limitations as a 
demigod, his books are revolutionary 
to the mass of church people. The 
popular church has received great 
energy from the debate. Fundamen-
talism has taken a variety of political 
shapes in two thousand years but, 
clearly, the dominant form at the mo-
ment is anti-humanist and anti-
reform. The incentive for lay people 
to take theological initiatives themsel-
ves and challenge fundamentalism on 
its own turf is tremendously exdting 
for our churches and society. 
The third aspect is a matter of evan-
gelism. Oearly in conflict with the 
dreaded televangelists, Spong is far 
from being a proselytiser. But he has 
been applauded in some sections of 
the church as communicating to op-
fressed and marginalised people: 
'the kingdom of God belongs to you". 
Evangelism, of the style that sections 
of the church see reflected in Spong's 
program, is good news for Australian 
Christians and for a society at odds 
with itself. 
Can Australian churches shake the 
colonial stigma and a wowser 
heritage? Spong may not be the 
answer but, as Dorothy McMahon, a 
Uniting Church Minister ln Sydney, 
said of him, "He is, at the very least, 
asking the right questions." 
ANDREW IRVINE works for the 
Au.atrallan Council of 0\urcha. 
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Shaky European Home 
As fate had it, the August coup in the Soviet Union 
coincided with Pope John Paul's tour in Hungary. 
Greeted with their first papal visit of the century, the 
Magyars had no intention of forfeiting their day in 
the sun to anyone at all, much less the Russians. The 
haunting sounds of mediaeval organ hymns echoed 
through Budapest's hushed courtyards as the media 
followed every sacred step of the pontiff's trip. 
That afternoon my way to the swim-
ming pool was blocked by legions of 
police who had cordoned off Hero's 
Square where the Pope was to address 
the masses later in the day. In the 
neighbourhood, I stopped by the 
Soviet embassy to see what was up. 
The sidewalk outside the grey granite 
building was crowded with booths 
selling cotton candy and Papa }Mos 
Pll II memorabilia. 200,000 Hun-
garians thronged to hear the Pope in 
Budapest, but not a single one showed 
up to protest at the overthrow of the 
man who opened the way for their 
country's democracy. 
In fact, there might have been more 
than a little ScJuzdenfreude in the hearts 
of the peoples of the former Eastern 
bloc-a pleasure not unconnected 
with the Holy Father's selective bless-
ings. For many Hungarians and Poles, 
Czechs and Slovaks, Slovenes and 
Croats, a united Europe implicitly 
means the restoration of European 
Christendom. It is a Europe of which 
Russia and its Orthodox brethren 
were never members. 
But the roup was over as suddenly as 
it began. As the tanks withdrew from 
Moscow and workers dismantled the 
Pope's towering podium in Hero's 
Square, a Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals appeared on track again. No 
doubt, the popular indignation and 
protest in the Soviet Union that drove 
tht! conservatives from power 
demonstrated an inspiring will to 
democracy. In many ways, the 
prospects for democratic reform now 
look brighter than ever before. 
Yet the conspirators' three-day 
takeover sent deep shock waves 
through the European House. Over-
night, Gorbachev's ouster seemed to 
put an abrupt end to plans for an in-
tegrated Europe. Although warnings 
of the Soviet leader's imminent 
downfall had been in the air for years, 
when the hardliners finally moved, 
Europe looked on aghast. Nine short 
months after the 35 participants of the 
Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (CSCE) signed the Paris 
Charter envisaging a European order 
based on human rights and 
democracy, the Cold War appeared on 
again. 
Upon the Soviet leader's return to 
power, Western leaders congratulated 
themselves for uniting against the 
plotters. The international com-
munity, however, bears a large share 
of the responsibility for the precarious 
situation throughout Eastern Europe. 
Their economies in ruin and their 
states fraught with ethnic tension, the 
stability of the Soviet Union as well as 
the central and eastern Europeans has 
hung by a thread for over a year. The 
US above all has contributed precious 
little to aid the East's painful transi-
tion, substituting slogans about 
freedom and democracy for roncrete 
economic and political initiatives. 
The harsh terms of the radical IMF-ad-
ministred free-market policies have 
pushed east and central European 
countries to the brink of collapse. The 
East has received only a fraction of the 
aid and investment that it was count-
ing on. Time and again it has been the 
US that has quashed West European 
efforts to co-ordinate large-scale aid 
programs for the East. 
From Berlin to Sofia, politicians surely 
must have reflected on their own fates 
too as they saw tanks lumber into Red 
Square. Their economies fare only 
slightly better than the Soviet Union's 
and even optimists see no short-term 
end to the economic tailspin. The east 
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Europeans are also still closely linked 
to the Soviet economy. They, as well as 
Austria, get the vast majority of their 
oil and gas from Soviet pipelines and 
still rely heavily on Soviet markets. 
Further upheavals there-which are 
almost certain~uld have dire im· 
plications for the long-promised 
reoovery. 
Although the power structures differ 
from country to country, the military 
in the weak Eastern European 
democracies will be key factors for 
some time. The armed forces in 
Belgrade and Bucharest are already 
poised to restore law and order. 
Strikes are likely to mar the coming 
winter in Hungary and Poland. But 
will John Major and George Bush 
protest so loudly if armies step in to 
restore free market law and order? 
The Soviet crisis also revealed just 
how close to the surface Ues the men-
tality of the Cold War. Still mired in the 
East-West logic of the past, Western 
leaders have woefully neglected the 
processes of European integration. 
For 60 hours, as the prospects of a 
peaceful continental order appeared 
shattered, the familiar mechanisms of 
the Cold War were set in motion. 
Europe's NATO brass were in their 
element again, bandying about 
heavy-handed threats and war 
scenarios at emergency crisis manage-
ment sessions. 
The CSCE, supposedly the new motor 
for a united Europe, still plays a dis-
tant second fiddle to NATO. For many 
conservatives, particularly in the US, 
the CSCE was simply a human rights 
body for the Cold War, the usefulness 
of which came to an end with the col-
lapse of communism. The US State 
Department and its allies in Europe 
have fought hard-and successful-
ly-to maintain NATO's priority over 
the CSCB and other non-military all-
European institutions. Only grudg-
ingly did NATO recently agree to tiny 
concessions for including the 
European Community (EC) and CSCB 
in security policy discussion. 
The threat of a hardline military dic-
tatorship next door also caused the 
Soviet Union's western border states 
Prag.u: cenJre of a fragile European home. 
to think twice about their own 
security policies. Although the pos-
sibility that Kremlin hardliners would 
try to 'take back' Eastern Europe hard-
ly seemed plausible, Poland, Czechos-
lovakia and Hungary all secured their 
borders. At a joint meeting. the three 
also discussed a co-ordinated 
response to a mass migration of 
people fleeing the crackdown. In the 
future, civil war in the Baltics or Mol-
davia could well spill over into their 
neighbours' backyards. 
These scenarios naturally frighten the 
Central and East Europeans who are 
now neither members of NATO nor 
the Warsaw Pact. Rather than try to 
fend for themselves, thus plummeting 
their strapped economies even further 
into debt and jeopardising western 
security, they are likely to speed up 
their entry into NATO. 
The West's special status for the 
central Europeans has simply 
widened the gap between the three 
and their Eastern colleagues. the day 
after the coup, for example, an emer-
gency EC meeting called for ac-
celerated integration of Hungary, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia into the 
community structures. Though 
laudable in its own right, the move 
treats Romania and the Balkan states 
as third class citizens. The two-tier 
policy in Eastern and Central Europe 
has left the Balkans as dangerously 
isolated as the Soviet Union. 
The less the Easterners feel part of 
Europe, the greater the likelihood of 
more military coups, regional wars 
and ugly crackdowns. At the moment, 
Romania is still being punished as a 
remnant of neo-a>mmunism. So fruit-
less has European diplomacy proved 
in Yugoslavia, the West has thrown up 
its hands in despair. Bulgaria has 
simply been forgotten about, and 
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Europe only wishes that it could for-
get about Albania. 
The instability in Eastern Europe un-
derlines the failure of Western policy. 
without far-reaching political and 
economic co-operation, Europe will 
not magically integrate itself. Neither 
in the Soviet Union nor in Central 
Europe are militar,>: solutions the 
answer to the region s dilemmas. 
Over the last weeks, Europe may have 
come closer to rerognising just how 
closely intertwined it is-whether its 
constituents like it or not. The coup in 
the Soviet Union was a desperate cry 
for help, and catastrophe was only 
narrowly, inaedibly averted. The in-
ternational community cannot afford 
to make the same mistake twice. 
PAUL HOCKENOS ia a Budapest-baed 
freelance joumaliat. 
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Atoll Order 
1991 marks the passing of a quarter of a century since 
the first test at Moruroa and over 100 years of French 
colonialism in French Polynesia. 
Yet French Polynesia was of little ron-
sequence to metropolitan officials 
prior to the decision to use Moruroa as 
a nuclear test site in the 1950s, when 
an alternative to Algeria was required. 
There was then a tightening of control 
over the oolony, including draoonian 
decrees to counteract the rapid 
growth of the indigenous nationalist 
movement It was not until 1977 that 
Paris granted the local territorial as-
sembly a statute of limited internal 
self-government and later a statute of 
internal autonomy which came into 
being in 1984. 
The Pacific testing centre (CEP) had a 
dramatic and ultimately detrimental 
impact on eoonomy and society. Ini-
tially, the CEP brought apparent 
prosperity in the form of massive in-
vestment in infrastructure, customs 
revenues, local expenditure and 
employ- \ent; during its first decade of 
operations, CEP expenditure was 
more than twice that of the territorial 
budget This was acoompanied by an 
influx of some 15,000 French person-
nel. The rapid drive to recruit Maohi 
(Polynesian) workers for the CEP was 
to be one of the main oontributors to a 
spiral of dependency. On many small 
outer islands the entire male popula-
tion left to sign up for the high CEP 
salaries. Consequently, subsistence 
agriculture and fishing were 
neglected and never reoovered. The 
unoontrolled urban drift led to over-
crowding, high unemployment and 
sub-standard living conditions 
around the capital of Papeete. 
tainment at the expense of traditional 
forms of kinship and cultural pur-
suits. This policy of Franoonisation 
oontrasted with the segregation prac-
tised in New Caledonia which saw 
Kanaks plaood on reserves far from 
the economic and political centre of 
Noumea. This partly explains the rela-
tive unity of the Kanak nationalists 
today compared with the smaller and 
more fragmented Mao hi inde-
pendence movement. 
Given the legacy of the CEP and the 
colonial relationship with France, a 
party challenging the French presence 
might be expected to gain widespread 
support. However, in the elections in 
March this year the two pro-inde-
pendence and anti-nuclear parties, 
Tavini and Ia Mana, garnered a total 
of merely four seats in the 41-seat as-
sembly, while the established oonser-
vative parties, Tahoeraa and Ai's 
Api, obtained 18 and five seats 
respectively. 
Part of the apparent failure of the pro-
independence parties can be at-
tributed to the skewed electoral 
system which gives disproportionate 
power to outer island voters. The es-
tablished conservative parties, par-
ticularly Tahoeraa, have been 
oonscious of this important electoral 
Increasing eoonomic dependency has 
been matched by an intense process of 
cultural assimilation. The migration 
of French citizens and their intermar-
riage with the Maohi people is one 
factor. In addition, the teaching of 
French language and culture ac-
celerated in the 1960s. Fmally, the 
shift by many Maohi from a rural sub-
sistence lifestyle to that of urban wage 
earners produced a preference for 
Western consumer goods and enter-
TM colonia/link persists:Frenchpri!M minister Mich£1 Rocard visils Tahili in 1989. 
AlR: OCTOBER 1991 
r.ctor and have gone to great lengths 
to cultivate support from the outer 
illands. The comparatively young 
m:t urban based pro-independence 
puties are disadvantaged by finan-
c:lal. transport and communications 
obstades in their attempt to reach the 
outer island electorate. Another elec-
toral law favouring the larger parties 
Ia that which eliminates all candidates 
whose lists obtain less than 5% of the 
votes cast in any of the five oonstituen-
del. Tahoeraa gained 18 of the 41 seats 
with only 31.5% of ballots cast In ef-
fect, candidates challenging the estab-
lished parties received a total of 27.4% 
of the votes but only acquired four 
.. ts. 
There is much popular sympathy for 
the anti-nuclear platform of Tavini 
1M Ia Mana. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the pro-independence parties do 
alienate some sections of the elec-
torate for whom independence poses 
emnomic uncertainties, including the 
level of assistance France would be 
prepared to provide. In this way the 
territory's eoonomic dependency, al-
beit a financial burden to France, en-
IUJ'e& widespread acquiescence to an 
cmgoing French presence and, by ex-
tension, the CEP. One factor which 
could sway popular opinion towards 
the 'independentistes' is concern 
about the imminent integration of 
Europe-French Polynesia is oon-
stitutionally still a part of France. 
There are widespread fears that un-
restricted European immigration to 
the territory would have a devastating 
impact on local society. 
l!xtema1 influences aside, the conser-
vative government of Gaston Flosse 
elected in March is already in trouble 
as it struggles to deal with a budgetary 
crisis inherited from the previous 
government The initial response was 
to instigate a sharp increase in indirect 
taxes. This precipitated protests in the 
form of blockades around the capital 
in June and July which culminated in 
riots. Theconflictwasonlyresolvedas 
a result of intervention by the French 
High Commissioner who promised 
French financial assistance in place of 
the proposed tax increases. Industrial 
action and riots were major factors 
leading to the downfall of Flosse and 
his government in 1987. And Flosse is 
still awaiting a verdict on the last of 
several corruption charges laid 
against him. The case will be heard in 
December 1991 and, if convicted, 
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JocquiDrolkt, WJdero[IMpro-independencelaManaparty. 
Flosse faces being barred from office, 
a fine, and up to two years in prison. 
Electoral politics in French Polynesia, 
now as in the past, is primarily 
governed by the appeal of charismatic 
leadership, patron-client relations 
and municipal loyalties. It is no coin-
cidence that four of the five parties in 
the territorial assembly are led by 
mayors of the largest municipalities in 
the territory. The rate of incumbency 
for mayors and territorial repre-
sentatives is very high. Debate over 
policy is not a feature of election cam-
paigns because the majority of parties 
have broadly similar socio-economic 
programs. The mainstream parties 
lack clearly~efined ideologies and 
cannot be distinguished on this basis. 
Political expediency remains the 
determining factor in shaping govern-
ment coalitions rather than any at-
tempt to be ideologically oonsistent 
However, the past decade has also 
witnessed a gradual but significant 
reclamation of politics and culture by 
the Mao hi people. This is most evident 
with regard to the increasing rejection 
of the French language. Tahitian be-
came an official language in 1980 and 
has since acquired dominance in the 
political arena. For political leaders to 
be successful they must now be able 
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to deliver eloquent speeches in 
Tahitian and political parties have all 
adopted Tahitian names. Tahitian lan-
guage radio stations have been estab-
lished in many municipalities. A 
radical Maohi theologian has aeated 
great oontroversy with an interpreta-
tion of the Bible which integrates the 
Christian message with Maohi iden-
tity. In the arts and the preservation of 
traditional monuments the Mao hi cul-
tural revival has also made its mark. 
Fmally, the hitherto taboo issue of in-
digenous land rights has become a 
legitimate subject for public debate. 
The renewed pride in Maohi history 
and culture emanating from the 
church and other social movements is 
already evident in the political arena, 
particularly in the Tavini party. The 
logical extension of the budding 
Maohi nationalism is to further ques-
tion the existing relationship with 
France. This process is, for the present. 
being obstructed within the territory 
by those who fear the economic 
ramifications of such a move, and by 
France because it sees no alternative 
site for nuclear tests. 
KARIN VON STROKIRCH works in the 
Centre for South Eut Aaian Studies at 
Monash Univemty. 
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Uptown Boys 
In September the Labor Caucus ruled 
on the amount of foreign equity the 
government would allow in the bid· 
ding for the John Fairfax newspaper 
group. The decision restricted bid· 
den to 20% foreign ownership by 
shareholding, but allowed for greater 
foreign equity by other means. It was 
widely criticised in the media -
moat prominently by the Centre 
Left's Senator Chris Schacht - as 
favouring the bid of the Conrad 
Black/Kerry Packer syndicate. The 
Left's John Langmore proposed the 
controversial motion, which was 
supported by most of the Left. ALR's 
Mike ncher spoke to John Langmore 
about the decision, and the con-
troversy. 
The Left has always been opposed to 
foreign investment in newspapers; 
why do you think they voted for your 
motion in this instance? 
Well, my motion was aimed at achiev-
ing exactly that - the restriction of 
foreign ownership. It's been entirely 
misrepresented by Chris Schacht. The 
motion is in two parts. What it says is 
firstly that the government should 
prefer complete Australian ownership 
of all major media, and secondly, that 
in any case, an absolute upper limit of 
20% of foreign ownership should be 
set. 
So why do you think he has read a 
completely contrary interpretation 
into it? 
I think he misunderstands the motion. 
He believes it allows what lay people 
are calling 'quasi-equity', which car-
ries some degree of control, to be 
raised outside the 20% limit- but in 
fact that's quite specifically excluded 
by the motion. What it's intended to 
say is that foreign equity and financial 
lrt.strwnents that give some degree of 
control up to 20%, can be allowed, but 
beyond that they can't be allowed. 
How tenable is that atgument that 
you can have foreign capital without 
any control at all? Presumably the 
money can always be withdrawn. 
No, I don't think so. H a bank lends 
money for a period, and signs a con-
tract, then it hasn't got the capacity to 
withdraw it. We're talking about bor· 
rowing, not something akin to shares. 
It's really a question of loans rather 
than non-voting shares or quasi-equi· 
ty. 
Do you think it's a fair perception 
that this motion is motivated not 
solely by a desire for more diversity 
but also as being antagonistic 
towards the Australian Independent 
Newspapers bid? 
Absolutely not. The motion is simply 
designed to set a framework for the 
limit to which foreign investment 
would be allowed in any major media. 
It doesn't attempt to differentiate be-
tween bidders, except in so far as 
there's a foreign involvement in them. 
To the extent that it can be seen to 
favour anyone, clearly it favours AIN, 
because it's wholly Australian-
owned, and that's what the motion 
says the government should prefer, 
but it doesn't rule out the O'Reilly bid, 
and it wouldn't rule out the 
Black/Packer bid if they brought it 
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within those guidelines. The inter· 
pretation that the motion favours 
P~cker is simply mischievous. It is 
neither the intention nor the substance 
of the resolution. In any case, becaU&e 
of this alleged misunderstanding, we 
will be presenting a more detailed mo-
tion to make crystal clear what itis that 
we're proposing. 
Kim Beazley was quoted as diaparar 
ing the AIN group bid as being from 
the .,uptown Melbourne estab-
lishment". Implicit in this view 
would seem to be the assumption 
that financial control is tantamollllt 
to some measure of editorial iJt. 
fluence. Would you agree with that? 
Well, it's true that is implied by some 
of the alleged remarks made by Beaz. 
ley,butthefactisthatAINhaveagreed 
to sign a charter of editorial ind• 
pendence. The degree of co-operation 
they've exhibited with Fairfax jour· 
nalists, particular I y the Friends of 
Fairfax, suggests that they wouldn't 
interfere. Who knows what would 
happen after they gained ownership, 
but those are the signals they're 
throwing out at present. 
Wouldn't you agree that editorial in-
depmdence is at least of equal im-
portance as where the money comes 
&om? 
Sure. All this motion was trying to do 
was clarify, and set guidelines for, the 
extent to which foreign investment 
would be allowed. It was motivated 
by the fact that there had been some 
talk a few days previously about in-
creasing the extent of foreign owner-
ship beyond 20% to 25%, 30% or even 
more. It seemed to me very important 
to have on the record a motion that 
clearly and definitely expressed a 
caucus view that foreign investment 
beyond 20% would not be permitted. 
The figure of 20% simply derives from 
the broadcasting limits, and the 
general argument that consistency 
aaoss the media is desirable seems 
warranted. The figure itself is ar-
bitrary of course, but 20% has already 
been set for broadcasting, so it may as 
well be set for print media as well. 
This government doesn't have a 
pd track record on media regula-
tion. If Black/Packer won the bid for 
Fairfax it would seem to have suc-
ceeded in achieving the worst of all 
possible worlds, in terms of both 
diversity (because of Packer's broad-
casting interests) and foreign owner-
ship. 
I certainly believe that the decision to 
allow News Umited to take over the 
Herald and Weekly Times was one of the 
worst decisions the government has 
made in the whole of the last eight and 
a half years, because it's allowed a 
quite unprecedented level of con-
centration of media ownership- un-
precedented in Australia and 
unparalleled in any other Western 
country at any time. And that must 
mean that our democracy is in a very 
unhealthy state, because with that de-
gree of concentration there is inevitab-
ly a narrowing of the range of ideas 
and information that are circulating in 
the community. You only have to com-
pare our press with that in Britain or 
the United States or Canada to see the 
relative lack of diversity here. 
Of course it would be an absolute dis-
grace and a disaster if the Black/Pack-
er bid won. But remember their bid 
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still has to be tested against the cross-
media ownership rules. The whole 
point of the amendment to the Broad-
casting Act introduced into Parlia-
ment in September is to strengthen 
and clarify those rules, so that the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal will 
have clearer guidelines as to how it 
should assess aoss-media ownership. 
Is it a fundamentally contradictory 
aim to be attempting to facillute 
both diversity and purely domestic 
ownership at one and the same time? 
Absolutely not. Australia is awash 
with funds looking for profitabie 
places to be located. The superannua-
tion funds are going to have hundreds 
of billions of dollars to invest over the 
rest of the decade. There are plenty of 
entrepreneurs here, and plenty of 
journalists who would love to be in-
volved in the management of the 
press. Clearly, the highestpriorityis to 
have greater diversity, but I don't see 
any reason why we should not seek 
both greater diversity and Australian 
ownership at the same time. 
MIKE TICKER. ia a member of ALR'a 
editorial collective. 
:\OW AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA List 
Blueprint 
fora 
Green 
Economy 
David PetiTCe,AnilMarlalndya and Edward B./JartJUr 
An Eartbscan publication 
This intensely topical book shows clearly bow air, water, 
ozone layers and all other environmental qualities can be 
costed. By demonstrating what pollution costs us, it also 
shows that by energetic intervention, governments can begin 
the gigantic clean-up on which all our futures depend. It 
presents governments for the first time, with a series of 
practical proposals for financing a sustainable environment. 
1989, 192pp, $16.95 (includes postage) · 
For a full catalogue of Earths can publications write to: 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
GPO Box 1S62. Canbeml ACI' 2601 
Ph: (06) 247 4822 Fax: (06) 247 5536 
CARE (Campaign Against Racial Exploita-
tion) a national network of anti-racist 
groups, on Aboriginal issues, anti-apartheid 
and other forms of racism. Publishes VNA 
(quarterly) $20 from: WACARE P.O. Box 159 
Mt Lawley 6050 W.A. (09) 328 9396. In South 
Australia contact: SA CARE (08) 232 0597 PO 
Box 51 Kensington 5068; Victoria P.O. Box 
261 Port Melbourne 3207. 
BLAST Magazine 
Looking for a literary magazine that contains 
satire, fiction, poetry and social comment -
from new and established writers - at a price 
you can afford? 
Blast Magazine- $15 for 4 issues/year 
Blast- PO Box 3514, Manuka, ACT, 2603. 
List is an opportunity for organisations to advertise events, 
meetings, publications and contacts. First listing free. Ring 
Suze lavers on (02)565-1855 or fax (02)550- 4460. 
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Unholy 
ORDERS 
'New world order': the Left's three favourite hate words of 
the year. But Diarmuid Maguire suggests righteous 
indignation isn't enough. A sober look at the new global 
realities is in order. 
he New World Order' threatens to be-
come as pervasive a slogan as 11Drink 
Coca Cola". It has entered our homes 
through the electronic media; it turns 
up our daily newspapers; and entire conferen-
ces are organised around the meaning of the con-
cept Indeed, one wouldn't be surprised to come 
across it on a trip to a remote village somewhere. 
Whenever I hear or read the phrase I imagine that 
a Saddam-like portrait of George Bush has been 
erected in my living room or on a billboard on my 
way to work. And my immediate urge is to pencil 
in a funny moustache and a pair of round glasses. 
It is clear that I am not alone. There are a host of subversive 
scribblers who insert in their articles a "dis'' before the 
"order'' or substitute "American" for "world". "Fight the 
New World Order!" screams a poster near my local railway 
station. This shows that some are prepared to challenge the 
concept head on. But the contested slogan survives even 
here. One wonders if such a campaign -like ''Don't Drink 
Coca Cola!" -can ultimately be successful. 
I must admit that there is a dark part of me that cheers 
every time there is some terrible international news. I 
know that this news chips away at the New American 
Order and illustrates the true character of our New World 
Disorder. In this regard - to paraphrase John Lennon ·I 
know I'm not the only one. But again, like Lennon, I would 
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New World Ordu, Old World problems 
much prefer to imagine a world that was better and explore 
positive ways to help build it. 
So what is 'The New World Order' exactly, and what are 
we supposed to do with it? Foritisn'tgood enough to draw 
funny moustaches or issue open challenges without know-
ing what one wants to subvert, fight or replace. It seems 
that at least three meanings have been attached to the 
slogan and it is useful to examine each in turn. 
New World Order One characterises an international sys-
tem that has supposedly beoome more stable and secure 
because of the end of the Cold War. From this viewpoint, 
the evaporation of the East-West equation and greater 
U>Soviet cooperation will reduce the nuclear threat and 
lead to the resolution of regional oonflicts. Although this 
version of the New World Order received a body blow with 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it was quickly reconstituted in 
the wake of the US victory over Iraq. 
New World Order Two stems from the notion that the 
oollapse of Soviet power represents the ultimate and global 
triumph of capitalist democracy. This thesis has been ar-
gued forcefully by Francis Fukuyama in his 'End of 
History' articles. It is an argument that has been criticised 
by those who see History's virulent return with the resur-
rection of ancient quarrels in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Regardless, it is clear that the marxist-leninist 
model of economic and political development has col-
lapsed and that the alternative of capitalist democracy has 
been used to fill the vacuum. In this manifestation of world 
politics in transition, peace and cooperation will be estab-
lished among states that need trade and investment and 
whose militaries will be subject to 'the democratic veto'. 
Fmally, New World Order Three condenses the previous 
two, but expresses them in concrete politico-strategic 
terms. That is, the US won the Cold War and it is the US 
that will shape the post-Cold War world. In this version, 
America will be the cautious leader of a unipolar world in 
which it shares not only power, but also the economic 
burden of hegemony. In return, it will help guarantee the 
survival of capitalism and democracy and will provide a 
modicum of international stability. 
All three world orders represent an attempt to envisage a 
replacement for an old international system that no longer 
exists. The Cold War Order has gone and it has left a 
vacuum in international poll tics. Old power structures and 
ideologies are being sloughed off painfully and slowly. 
Leaders are searching for principles and institutions 
around which to organise a new system. The post-Cold 
War era is still pre-Something Else, and slogans like 'The 
New World Order' hide the fact that nobody knows what 
that 'Something' will be. Will international politics in fu-
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ture be shaped by cooperative security alliances, the 
'natural' harmony of capitalist democracy, or the continu-
ing dominance of the United States? 
New World Order One: Saddam Hussein's invasion of 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990 not only challenged New World 
Order One, but also illustrated what superpower clients 
might do if freed from Cold War constraints. The degenera-
tion of the international system into a Hobbesian 'war of 
all against all' was something that the US and the Soviets 
were determined to prevent Bush's repeated references to 
the collapse of global order in the 1920s and 1930s, and his 
comparison of Saddam with Hitler, revealed this deep-
seated fear. The US administration also sought to use the 
Gulf War as a means of forging new security arrangements 
through coalition building and burden sharing among 
capitalist democracies- old, new and potential. 
In the short-term, the coalition was a success. In the long-
term, however, no structures have been established to 
fight, let alone prevent such wars in future. The United 
Nations merely sanctioned the use of force by the US-led 
alliance and thus was not strengthened as an international 
security organisation. NATO was not involved and still 
resists the idea of military engagement outside Europe. 
The organisation that was established, in the words of one 
of its architects to ''keep the Soviets out, the Americans in 
and the Germans down", no longer has a rationale for 
existing. The European Community lacks the military ap-
paratus to guarantee 'order' internally or externally. This 
can be seen by the failure of its monitors in attempting to 
impose a ceasefire in Yugoslavia by carrying little more 
than EC flags. 
All the Gulf War demonstrated was that an international 
coalition can be established if conflict breaks out in a a vital 
strategic and economic region. But the tremendous effort 
that went into defeating such a small nation cannot be 
exerted repeatedly. Thus the Kurds and the Shi'ites have 
been subjected to renewed Iraqi attacks and receive little 
more than rhetorical support Yugoslavia is left to pursue 
its own civil war which has already claimed more casual-
ties than those borne by the allies in the Gulf. 
The greatest challenge to New World Order One comes 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There, old elites 
in new guises struggle to preserve their power and some 
are willing to shed blood in order to do so. Conflicts are 
becoming more fierce in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Ukraine and the central Asian republics. But there are no 
international frameworks for resolving them, or even dam-
pening their effects. 
It is unclear how the New World Order can maintain 
international security when these conflicts spill across na-
tional boundaries and challenge their very existence. 
Under these circumstances, the Bush administration is 
forced to sit back and observe these events like the rest of 
us. This explains its caution in recognising various inde-
pendence movements. If a large and important part of the 
world is deprived of legitimate national boundaries, there 
can be no international stability and order for the foresee-
able future. 
New World Order Two: Perhaps these problems might be 
resolved as the free market and representative democracy 
slowly encourage individuals to pursue more material 
gains and to settle their differences peacefully. This is the 
solution advanced by the advocates of New World Order 
Two. They argue that the end of the Cold War shows that 
capitalist democracy is the only viable way to manage a 
political and economic system. Thus the problems of post· 
communist regimes can be solved by their societies absorb-
ing the short-term pain of market transition and fully 
accepting representative democracy. It has been claimed 
that countries like Poland have already moved well along 
this path. 
Yet this analysis of the post-communist world fails to 
recognise how old elites there are engaged in a struggle to 
effect control of the means of production and existing state 
structures. Democratic centralisers want to maintain the 
nation-state but transform its institutions. Authoritarian 
centralisers work to keep the nation-state and existing 
institutions intact. And regional ethnocrats - whether 
authoritarian or democratic- are prepared to encourage 
ethnic conflict in order to challenge present boundaries. 
But all are capable of accepting the market and the trap-
pings of democracy if it helps them realise their goals. In 
this way, after the transition to capitalist democracy, the 
same people remain in charge but, as the Poles say, they 
now wear different hats. Often their power is legitimated 
by free elections. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, elections 
allow the ruled in Eastern Europe to hear their new chains 
rattle. 
Like most of Latin America, much of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union is now formally democratic. But also like 
Latin America, this democracy is a thin electoral veneer 
that covers highly elitist power structures. The pre-coup 
Soviet Union was managed by an unelected Soviet Presi· 
dent who ruled by decree. The post-coup Soviet Union is 
run by Russia's first elected president, who nonetheless 
prefers the same method of control. 
The argument that the marriage of capitalism and 
democracy will produce 'order' in the East also ignores 
important lessons from history. It is no easy task to absorb 
the social costs of the market and maintain political 
democracy simultaneously. Italy, Germany and Spain dis-
covered this in the interwar years. The birth of new 
capitalist democracies in the international system is no 
guarantee of future stability and order. 
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New World Order Three: Given the limitations of the first 
two alternatives, is the United States the only power 
capable of promoting international stability? The US is a 
representative democracy and it has the world's largest 
capitalist economy and military machine. It has no real 
challengers in the international system, and even powerful 
economic actors like Germany and Japan are prepared to 
follow its political lead. It has even been argued that the 
US governs a unipolar world and that this will be the case 
for some time to come. 
But the US isn't running the world at the moment. Nobody 
is. It's just that the US reaction to a particular world event 
is much more important than that of anyone else. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait provided it with a rare opportunity to 
exercise its power successfully. The strategic importance of 
the region, the brutal nature of the aggression and the lack 
of a skilled opponent weighed the odds heavily in 
America's favour. This oombination is unlikely to occur 
again. 
The Gulf War also revealed a central weakness in the 
position of the US. It may well be that there is no great 
power interested in pushing America off its perch. But the 
US is economically reliant on other great powers to stay 
there. The demands for economic contributions during the 
war against Iraq showed that the US does not have the 
domestic base to sustain its solitary superpower status. In 
fact, America's military machine is now being cut to the 
size of a declining national economy. 
Perhaps America did win the Cold War, but it certainly 
exhausted itself in the process. The collapse of Soviet 
power and the failure of a new challenger to emerge, makes 
the US look much stronger than it actually is. Imagine if 
after World War Two the United States and the Soviet 
Union did not exist, leaving only Britain and Germany. 
Britain would still be exhausted by war, but the remnants 
of its former power would seem to be more important. 
Germany, by contrast, would be even more devastated -
economically crushed and shattered as a unified nation-
state- because Britain oouldn't afford to help her. This 
analogy, though flawed, captures an important truth about 
the current international situation. 
Furthermore, if the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe con-
tinue to be dominated by old elites wearing 'new hats', the 
same is also true of the United States. The President is a 
former UN ambassador, envoy to China and director of the 
CIA He was Reagan's vice-president throughout Cold 
Warn. Those around him also have impeccable elite and 
Cold War credentials. Together, they run a Cold War 
military-industrial apparatus which not only remains in-
tact, but is searching for new missions to justify its exist-
ence. Drug traffickers and terrorists compete to be the new 
number one enemy, while the threat of an Islamic bomb is 
the latest justification for continuing with the expensive 
Star Wars program. 
The oontinuous rule of Cold War elites in a post-Cold War 
era also has an ideological effect. Put bluntly, these rulers 
lack a strategic vision for the role of their nation in the new 
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international system. Gorbachev's blindness in this regard 
almost had fatal consequences for him personally. Bush's 
strategic myopia has resulted in disasters in Panama and 
the Middle East. 
Bush's failure to define the exact meaning of his New 
World Order and how it might be implemented has been 
hidden by some great successes in the day-to-day manage-
ment of US foreign policy. But reactive political ad-hoc-ery 
cannot sustain New World Order Three. The US ad-
ministration palpably lacks the vision and the means to 
develop its version of the New World Order. It has simply 
provided the world with an empty phrase to cover its own 
lack of strategy in the post-Cold War era. 
It has often been pointed out that one of the great ironies 
of this century has been that the Left has been 'nationalised' 
as capitalism becomes internationalised. European 
socialist parties, with the exception of the Italians, sup-
ported their nation-states in World War One. 'Socialism in 
One Country' became the motto of Eastern and Western 
communist parties. In the Third World, marxist-leninist 
organisations were, at best, movements for national libera-
tion. Almost everywhere, social democracy and marxism-
leninism became statist strategies for increasing power and 
wealth. 
The collapse of the Bolshevik model means that one path 
of national development for the Left has been closed off. 
The current crisis of social democracy (since the mid-1970s) 
shows that 'Social Democracy in One Country' isn' t pos-
sible either. Thus the Left must be de-nationalised and 
re-internationalised if it wants to solve its own problems 
and help resolve those of the world. The historic split of 
1917 is no longer relevant, and it is time to fundamentally 
re-examine these basic issues. 
None of the three dominant world orders, as presently 
defined, will solve the problems of superpower decline 
and the eruption of regional conflicts. The four 'P's of 
poverty, patriarchy, pollution and proliferation also remain 
unaddressed by existing alternatives. This should not give 
us satisfaction, but instead spur our thoughts and our 
actions. One can only hope that a pluralistic and interna-
tional Left can meet the exciting challenges of this new 
post-Cold War world. If itdoesn' t,itwilldeserveitscurrent 
media caricature as offering no concrete solutions to real 
and pressing global problems. 
DIARMUID MAGUIRE teaches in the Deparbnent of 
Government at the University of Sydney. 
ALR : OCTOBER 1991 
14 FEATURES 
Are we all 
SOCIAL 
DE OC TS 
now? 
Following the USSR's August coup Mikhail Gorbachev 
finally bade farewell to Soviet socialism. He now 
considered himself, he said, a Western-style socialist in the 
model of Willy Brandt and the Swedish Social Democrats. 
The epoch of 1917 finally drew to a close. But what does 
the belated death of the revolutionary mystique mean for 
the Western Left? Are we all social democrats now? ALR 
asked four political observers for their opinions. 
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End of the 
Line 
With the collapse of Gorbachev's 'reform communism' the 
Left's dreams of a 'third way' have finally been shattered. But 
Mitchell Dean argues a retreat to the rhetoric of democracy 
isn't enough. 
T 
he condition of the Left today must be 
stated frankly: it is one of ideological 
and political disarray. Under the im-
pulse of Green politics and feminism, 
and new forms of oppositional cultural move-
ments, the Western left has been involved in a 
long-term shift away from marx.ist socialism for 
the past decade, symbolised by the effective dis-
solution of Western Communist parties. The 
events of 1989 and 1991, first in the former Soviet 
satellites, and now in the Union itself, have ce-
mented this shift. 
Not only is the Cold War over, but so too is the rhetoric of 
the division of the world into two antagonistic power blocs, 
and, as a oorollary, the politics of confrontation. At the same 
time, the possible terrain for the Left seems fraught with 
dangers: a 'realist' social democracy committed to 
eoonomic management within the existing and deeply 
problematic institutions of liberal democracy, or a 
'utopian' radical democracy, which reinterprets soctalism 
as an extension of democracy, without being able to ad· 
dress substantive issues of economic and soctal policy or 
to muster popular support. For the Left today, there are no 
easy solutions, and we should be wary of those who claim 
to have them. That would include a retreat into a comfort-
able soctal democracy. 
While oommunism existed in Eastern Europe, it was al-
ways possible for the Left to imagine an internal 
democratisation of these regimes leading to a 'third way' 
between tyranny of the state and the logic of the market. 
The aborted roup has made clear that there is no turning 
back towards a reconstructed marxist soctalism in the East. 
The lesson for the left was that any dream of a 'third way' 
was illusory, that marxism-leninism could not provide the 
framework for institutional reform in Soviet socteties, and 
that the end of communism was a condition for extending 
the process of reform. In accepting these propositions, 
however, conventional Left positions are revealed as ir-
relevant to the problems faced by these socteties - those 
of economic collapse, of national and ethnic divisions, of 
political instability and political immaturity, of refugees, 
and of the rejection of the rule of law in favour of civil war. 
The Left's position is hardly better placed in regard to the 
liberal-democratic West, particularly in those oountries 
fating long·term economic and industrial decline such as 
Australia. Long·term, cyclical economic depression, a~ 
parently irreversible deindustrialisation, chronic un· 
employment and mass poverty have not been a fruitful 
oontext for the Left. It has remained powerless in the face 
of the dismantling of the welfare state • perhaps due to 
ambivalence in the first place, but more likely due to its 
inability to provide an alternative program for economic 
reform and recovery, or for political change. 
The institutions of liberal democracy have proved unable 
to provide for even minimal levels of citizen partictpation, 
public debate, policy choice and government account-
ability. While the Right would hail the changes in the East 
as a victory for democracy, these changes reveal in full light 
the poverty of our own democratic institutions, the flimsy 
nature of their legitimation and the endemic problems of a 
deregulated market economy. 
H liberal democracy is fundamentally flawed, then so too 
is a political ideology which would claim to manage the 
economy in the interests of a modicum of soctal justice. 
Social democracy, by definition, accepts the limits set by 
theinstitutionsofrepresentativedemocracy. The only form 
of participation and accountability it knows is 
managerialist corporatism, as the recent Australian ex-
perience has shown. Labourism, our indigenous version of 
social democracy, with its penchant for enlisting the ser-
vices of the shady side of the 'big end of town', amplifies 
some of the species' worst tendenctes. 
It must be said, however, that it has at least been prepared 
to listen to agendas other than those of economic 
rationalism, and its persistence in government has 
protected Australians from a fate comparable to 
Thatcherism. Yet, contrary to Gorbachev's statement, so· 
ctal democracy offers no safe haven for the Left after the 
collapse of communism. Its major attraction is its status as 
a component of twa.party systems, where the alternative 
is a wholesale radical destruction of social rights and 
cttizen participation in favour of an out-of-control market 
logic. 
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The other option also involves democracy. The great 
temptation now is to take up and radicalise the Right's 
position. The latter presents liberal democracy as the solu-
tion to all existing problems in the East In the case of the 
Left, a kind of outbidding occurs in which socialism now 
lays claim to the true legacy of democracy. This is the 
position of the new democratic Left. It theorises a renewal 
of democracy through the social movements and citizen 
participation of 'civil society'. The key theoretical problem 
here is the failure to recognise what even bourgeois poll tical 
economy already knew, that civil society is the sphere of 
those antagonistic interests which give rise to the state and 
which lead to pluralist party systems under ronditions of 
liberal democracy. The political danger in the West is that 
greater democratisation becomes a mere slogan which ron-
Cl!als the absence of substantive economic and social policy 
engagement on the one hand, and a program for political 
and constitutional reform on the other. In the East, the 
danger is that the appeal to the coalitions forged in civil 
society may bea>me the basis for populist, authoritarian 
rule, as recent developments in Soviet Georgia have al· 
ready shown. 
Neither existing social democracy, nor projected radical 
democracy offers us a ready alternative to discredited 
political theology. There is no correct line or '-ism' towards 
which the Left can retreat. The urgent need is not sloganis-
ing, but the reconstruction of the Left's agenda so that it 
takes its place within those debates which will determine 
the shape of our future. 
MITCHELL DEAN teaches in aodology at Macquarie 
University. Hie 'I'M Constitution of PO'Derty: Tow11rdl • 
Gnutdogy of Libn11l GO'Denu~nu waa recently publiahed by 
Routledge. 
What Social 
Democrat is 
That? 
If we're all sodal democrats now, Winton Higgins observes, 
the way to tell us apart may be to look at our backbones ... 
I 
f we are now all social democrats it is 
high time we identified the major sub-
species and located ourselves properly 
in this otherwise vaguely-defined 
category. An early social democrat, Rosa Luxem-
burg, once observed that all animals (political 
ones in particular) fell into two categories-those 
with backbones who could stand and get around 
upright, and those without, who are condemned 
to less dignified postures and locomotion. Ver-
tebrates and invertebrates, as zoologists say. The 
distinction holds among self-styled social 
democrats, too. 
Three years ago the then Swedish treasurer succinctly and 
authoritatively summed up his own invertebrate form of 
social democracy. Capitalism is the inevitable and unsur-
passable basis of productive organisation, he said. 
Socialism is about redistribution only. From this brief for-
mulation we can see clearly the resignation and self~ecep-
tion that characterises the invertebrate posture. It beguiles 
itself into believing that there is no necessary connection 
between relations of production and relations of distribu· 
tion, as if the goose magnanimously abandons the golden 
eggs it lays. In reality, the pure-bred capitalist goose only 
lays those golden eggs it gets to keep. 
After over eight years of invertebrate social democracy in 
Australia the pattern is as clear as it is unsurprising. 
Capitalism has been managed on its own traditionally 
preferred terms (rebadged as economic 'rationalism'). 
Only in the convict era and the depression has our 
workforce been treated with comparable ruthlessness and 
contempt. Economic decision-makers have made a virtue 
of inhumanity in their pursuit of 'efficiencies' (for which 
read 'degradation of services' in most instances) in the form 
oflayoffs and job reorganisation. Unemployment will soon 
return to double digits. And after so many years of 
'efficiencies' and 'necessary sacrifices' as preludes to 
'affluence' we find we can no longer afford viable publk 
education, health and child care, transport and broadcast-
ing-the most basic underpinnings of our quality of life. 
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Invertebrate social democracy is an international move-
ment and our local experience of it is unremarkable. Even 
in the social democratic holy land, Sweden, it has taken the 
lead, as it has here, in declaring much of social life unaffor-
dable and engaging in what it used to abhor as 'social 
disarmament'. Political science has yet to come up with a 
IUbstitute for a backbone. 
Some of us social democrats find this invertebrate mutant 
leas than compelling. It is neither social nor democratic. 
Fortunately, we can avail ourselves of the vertebrate strain, 
and withreliefdiscoveronlythemosttenuousgeneticlinlcs 
between it and the invertebrate condition. Vertebrate social 
democrats are predators rather than parasites on 
mpitalism. The basic premise of this social democracy is 
that capitalism is an inefficient and destructive basis for the 
further development of mature industrial society •. As long 
as paper entrepreneurs disorganise our indusbies, the lat-
ter will not fulfil their historic promise of greater in-
dividual social choice for less drudgery. The tempo of work 
inaeases today for less socially relevant output. 
Thereisa second basic point about capitalism which enjoys 
great programmatic relevance among vertebrates. In flat 
opposition to the economists' old furphy that efficiency 
and equity are antithetical, capitalism's inequity and inef-
ficiency reinforce each other. Conversely, democratic and 
egalitarian reforms to economic organisation and income 
distribution have fostered economic prosperity and social 
justice in countries where social democrats have broken 
through. For the vast majority, the pursuit of democratic 
norms, equity and efficiency carries Its own fairly immedi-
ate rewards. Yet this line of reform is no mere palliative. 
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Over time it implies the cumulative displacement of 
capitalist institutions that chronically underachieve and 
are incorrigibly inegalitarian and oligarchical. 
Thenaturalhabitatofvertebratesocialdemocratsis,infact, 
the socialist tradition, but they distinguish themselves 
from its other denizens by combining two characteristic 
modes of thought. FirSt, they eschew the pseudo-scientific 
determinism which rules out of court any inquiry into the 
ethical roots of human happiness. Rather, these social 
democrats mobilise around the original aspirations of 
socialism-freedom, individuality, community, participa-
tion, equality. Unless the political will can assert these 
values in the face of 'objective conditions', how can anyone 
take the socialist project seriously? 
Second, social democracy proposes handier criteria than 
paper profits for that supreme modem value, efficiency. 
Economic organisation is efficient when it targets produc-
tion to social requirements on environmentally sustainable 
terms (including minimised inputs) while offering mean-
ingful, co-operative work to the direct producers and equal 
opportunities for real life choices to all individuals. When 
smash-grab capitalism is measured against these criteria, 
the shortfalls that appear show the vertebrates just where 
to begin. 
We can warm up with a few back stretches. .. 
WINTON HIGGINS teachn in political science at Mac-
quarie University and has been a longtime advocate of the 
Swediah todal democratic tradition. 
Citizens and 
Social 
Democrats 
Peter Beilharz argues that the death of 'scientific socialism' 
unlocks a plethora of social democratic pasts. 
[] 
re we all social democrats now? It was a 
clever, foolish Englishman who more 
than a century ago ventured the opinion 
that 'we' were 'all' socialists now. He 
was referring, essentially, to an alleged consensus 
concerning the necessity of local or state 
provision, which has remained a consistently 
debated issue ever since. A hundred yean on in 
the antipodes, especially after the influence of 
the trend which Michael Pusey analyses in his 
new book on the arrival of Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra, we are all economic rationalists; for 
others, writing in the cultural sphere, we are all 
now postmodernists, etcetera. 
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We are, of oourse, not 'all' anything at all-except human 
beings; though there is some argw:nent about that, too. Yet 
radicals-readers of Austrtdilm Left Reuiew, for example-
have some shared sources of identity. And a hundred years 
ago, our predecessors reading Die Neue Zeit would 'all' 
have been social democrats-for 'social democrat' was the 
fin-dEH;iecle equivalent of 'marxist', and many socialists 
viewed marxism and socialism as oo-extensive. Whatever 
marxism's own territorial claims to monopoly of wisdom. 
however, sodal democracy certainly represented dif-
ference. In the German Social Democratic Party reforming 
feminists such as Uly Braun clashed with hardliners like 
Clara Zetkin, while revolutionaries like Alexander Hel-
phand-Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg scuffled with poor 
Eduard Bernstein, the great revisionist In the Russian So-
cial Democratic Labour Party there were simultaneously 
softies like Martov and hardnosed professional 
revolutionaries such as Lenin. When taunted, was he a Jew 
or a Russian, the young Leon Trotsky replied simply-
'neither: I am a Social Democrat'. Sodal democracy, 
whatever else it was, gave an image of purpose combined 
with difference in perspective; it contained the eagle-eyed 
Lenin and the blinking Martov, the young Antonio Gramsd 
and Jean Juares, the smug August Bebel and the smugger 
Karl Kautsky, as well as Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. 
A hundred years ago social democrats-including even the 
revisionist Bernstein-still defined themselves as marxists. 
Marxist credentials have weighed heavily in debate ever 
since; even Foucault and Derrida have on occasions been 
known to describe themselves as marxists, and, as some 
unJdnd observers have remarked, the recent protracted 
struggle between 'class politics' and 'alliance' politics on 
the Western Left sometimes resembled a staged replay of 
the earlier battles between Luxemburg and Bernstein. 
Looking like a marxist, or having decent 'credentials', is still 
an important thing; as some people have pointed out, 
postmarxist is a much more ambivalent condition than the 
'post' at first suggests. 
Yet much has changed. Ten years ago, perhaps a little more, 
a marxist (such as I then was) would have explained 
socialism negatively, via Marx's very good book Ozpitld. 
The argument went something like this. Capital was essen-
tially a sodal relation; socialism. it followed, had to be the 
negation of capitalist production. Alienation oould only be 
overcome if labour power was no longer commodified. 
Socialism oould only involve the regime of the associated 
producers. No money, and likely no state. No troubles. 
Today, socialism makes more sense (to me) as the organisa-
tion of ideas, practices and resources with which we are 
already largely working. The Fall of the Wall reinforces the 
point, which had been argued for enough earlier already, 
that socialists still need markets. The point now, rather, is, 
as Michael Walzer says, that the morality of the bazaar 
belongs to the bazaar. To argue for sodalism, as Karl 
Polanyi put it, means to acknowledge the sodal over the 
economic, to insist that economic means must be put to 
social ends. This is as good a working definition of social 
democracy as I can find because it isn't excessively 
programmatic so much as it is normative; it avoids imply-
ing (as Marx did) that socialism was a condition, his OWl\ 
favoured interpretation of the end of the history-prehistory 
scenario. 
Certainly social democracy can still be defended, in the 
manner of the Swedish Social Democrats, as a kind of 
political long-wave theory, identifying the task as succes-
sive waves of democratisation going through politics, 
society, and economy. All this echoes through Marshall's 
idea of progressive phases of citizenship, dvil, political and 
social rights. But ina more general sense, too, it ought to be 
reoognised that socialism and sodal democracy contain 1 
storehouse of traditions ignored until recently, because of 
the reign of so-called scientific socialism over other local 
and variegated traditions. There are a few things here 
which even Gorbachev could learn from-though that par· 
ticular possibility is unlikely, and is one reason why Gor-
bachev the reform communist has yielded to Yeltsin. The 
Gorbachev moment has passed, ooup or no ooup. 
The central victim in this process is arguably less the idee 
of planning or regulation than the idea of revolution. Yet 
again, socialists under the influence of Gramsci were al· 
ready arguing for processual rather than ruptural hopes of 
change into the 80s. At the time, they were damned by 
superior revolutionary minds who made the charge that 
Eurocommunism really represented the creeping social-
democratisation of marxist politics. Perhaps the superior 
critics were correct. The dispute nowadays seems to be one 
over the oontent of social democracy, its earlier radical 
impulse, its postwar Keynesian administrative form, and 
its remaining hopes and prospects. 
Are we then, all social democrats now? 'No; but what 1 
shame'-might be an immediate response. A more 
measured response might be different There is no prospect 
(or risk) of 'us' ~Zll, Australia-wide and to a person, becom-
ing sodal democrats, and even if there were there would 
still be lots of issues over which we should properly oon-
tinue to disagree. 'We' may 'all' be sodal democrats now In 
a residual, historical sense, but no more than that Those for 
whom the condition is potentially positive need to redis-
cover the traditions of various sodalisms and radicalisms 
and rethink them. The more immediate challenge in 
Australia is that of endeavouring to place social democracy 
back on the sodal agenda, not least of all in Canberra. 
Somewhere near the bottom of the list on this agenda will 
do, for a start. 
A great labour lies before us, wherever we now find oursel-
ves, however we now define ourselves, as inheritors d 
soda1 democracy or the radical traditions, as socialists or 
radicals. The certainty that we are great in numbers need 
not be part of this process. As Bernstein said, historicll 
materialists were Calvinists without God. We need to 
choose our own gods, and argue for them in the contingeat 
world which is politics. 
PETER BEILHARZ teaches in sociology at La Ttobe UDIYeo 
eity. He is one of the authora of Arguing About the Welfare Still: 
The Australilm Experience (Allen and Unwin, folthcomin&). 
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After Karl and 
Beatrice 
Marxism may be dead, but old-style Fabianism is pretty sick 
too. Race Mathews looks to a social democracy beyond the 
public corporation. 
I 
f we are all social democrats now, it is 
the structures in which we have con-
fidence which have changed, not our 
principles or objectives. Our noses 
have been rubbed comprehensively in the 
deficiencies of statutory corporations and the 
command economy. The need to achieve better 
ways of working together re.main.s the same. 
Demoaatic socialists and social democrats should not be 
aeeldng to abolish private ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange, as our ronservative 
critics constantly claim but, rather, to disperse and 
demoaatise ownership in ways which rule out exploita-
tion and other forms of misuse. It is no useful part of the 
social democratic or demoaatic socialist program to take 
major industries out of the hands of faceless and unac-
oountable boards of directors, elected by shareholders 
whose function is otherwise restricted to the provision of 
capital, only to vest them in statutory rorporations which 
ao far have not been observed to behave any better. What 
should be non-negotiable, as far as democratic socialists 
and social democrats are roncemed, is the principle that no 
member of our oommunity should live olf the product of 
another's work, and that there should be a say in the 
governance of the workplace for every workforce member 
who wishes to take advantage of it. It follows that a social 
demoaatic or democratic socialist society ought to encom-
pass a rich profusion of ownership arrangements, from 
oorporations with employee shareholdings, to the tradi-
tional owner-operated business. 
Historically, sodal democrats have been rontent simply to 
shuffle enterprises between the private and public sectors. 
The democratic socialism or social demoaacy of the future 
should be roncemed rather to open up the possibility of a 
new, third sector, where increasingly workers and con-
sumers exercise ownership in oonformity with the needs of 
the rommunities to which they belong. Enterprises such as 
these would have four common characteristics. First, ex-
ploitation of one person's work by another would be ruled 
out by enterprise self-ownership, with the workers them-
selves as shareholders. Seoondly, as co-owners, workers 
would have the governance of the enterprise in their own 
hands, and decide for themselves precisely how far to 
involve themselves in management and decision-making 
processes. Thirdly, accountability would be achieved by 
writing into the enterprise's constitution or articles of as-
sociation its obligations to the wider rommunity, subject to 
an annual assessment of social as well as finandal perfor-
mance through external audit. Fmally, diversity would be 
promoted through a decentralist approach, with each 
enterprise choosing its own path towards self-ownership, 
self-government and self-regulation, as well as the pace of 
change and the manner in which it takes place. 
The great industrial co-operatives at Mondragon in Spain 
are a case in point. In 1956, a handful of Mondragon 
townspeople decided to break out from the poverty which 
had dominated their lives since the Ovil War. A co-opera-
tive was started which used hand tools and sheet metal to 
manufacture paraffin-fired domestic heating and rooking 
stoves for the local market. Today, Mondragon is the centre 
of a group of more than 100 major industrial co-operatives. 
The group's products include heavy earth-moving 
machinery, ultra-sophisticated machine tools, furniture, 
white goods such as refrigerators and washing machines, 
and a wide range of other capital equipment and consumer 
durables. The industrial co-operatives, in tum, are serviced 
by seoondary co-operatives, including the group's bank-
the Caja l.aboral Popular-which has made them capital 
self-sufficient; and associated ro-operatives for research 
and development, health care and sodal security, primary 
and serondary schools, a co-operative university of tech-
nology; and a co-operative school of business manage-
ment. There are also agricultural co-operatives and 
housing co-operatives. 
All told, the Mondragon co-operatives have in every way 
enriched the lives of the more than twenty thousand 
families who make up their memberships. It is arrange-
ments of this sort, and not the rommand economy or 
statutory rorporations, which reflect the authentic face of 
social democracy or democratic socialism, and move us 
forward in the direction of the sodety of equals which is 
our enduring goal. 
RACE MATHEWS it a member of the Victorian puliunent 
and president of the Australian Fabian Society. 
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Belgrade 
BREAKUP 
Wracked by civil war, Yugoslavia now looks ungovernable. 
Yet the roots of the crisis lie deep in the Titoist past. 
Paul Hockenos spoke to Yugoslavia's most famous 
dissident, Milovan Djilas, about the country's impasse 
and its origins. 
ilovan Djilas, 79, is Yugoslavia's most 
famous former dissident. In 1932, the 
young Montenegrin joined the then-
illegal Communist Party of Yugos-
lavia and later led the World War Two 
underground resistance as a partisan general. 
After the war, Djilas was Tito's right-hand man 
until his democratic objections to Yugoslavia's 
course precipitated his expulsion from the party 
in 1954. As an outspoken critic of the regime, his 
views and numerous books cost him ten years' 
imprisonment. Only in May 1989 did he achieve 
de facto rehabilitation when he began to appear 
openly in the media. 
AB one of postwar Yugoslavia's founding fathers, how 
do you feel today as you witness the country's violent 
collapse? 
I had long predicted the downfall of Tito' s centralised 
Yugoslavia. Of course, I didn't suppose that the state 
would disintegrate so rapidly-although, unlike the 
Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, the evolution of the 
system here has been in progress for some time. I thought 
that after so many years of dictatorship the initial reaction 
of people would be more democratic. I knew, of course, 
that nationalism would play a great role in Yugoslavia, 
but I didn't foresee it being this strong. 
Yet, single party rule is over and democratic elections 
have been held in every republic. .. 
Certainly, elections marked the beginning of a process of 
democratisation. But the end of communist rule brought 
different nationalistic movements to power in every 
republic in Yugoslavia. Regardless of their ideologiml 
pretences, there are no essential differences between the 
regimes in the six Yugoslav republics. While the govern-
ments are democratically elected, the parliaments are 
ineffectual and the oppositions everywhere are very 
weak. The means of information are by and large tighdy 
controlled. In Belgrade and Zagreb, as well as Skopje and 
Ljubljana, what we have now are autocratic nationalistic 
governments in power. 
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How do you explUI\ the intenaity and ferocity of 
Dllionaliam in Yugoslavia today? 
Nationalism, of course, has deep roots here. The Croats, for 
mmple, have been obsessed with the aeation of their own 
1tate since the 13th century. But four decades of communist 
dictatorship haven't helped any. The communists blocked 
the growth of a democratic consciousness here by suppress-
Ing every form of opposition-particularly democratic op-
position. 
Nationalism was also suppressed but, unlike democracy, it 
Is a spontaneous movement. In the new political space, 
utionalist populist groups found the national ideologies 
euy to manipulate. The Serb and Croat ruling parties 
launched fierce nationalistic campaigns against one 
IJ\Other that fanned hatred and laid the basis for military 
mnflict 
So, the break-up of post-Tito Yugoslavia wu inevitable? 
In its communist form-yes. Maybe if Tito had been more 
elastic much earlier on, less orthodox in his ideology, things 
would look different today. I advocated a step by step 
process of democratisation in the early 1950s. But Tito was 
a dictator, and dictators demand full control. 
War is already a reality. What are your thoughts u Yugos--
lavia .Udea ever deeper into dvil war again after4S years? 
This is a crazy war because it is one that nobody will win. 
Even if we imagine a Serbian or Croatian victory, the essen-
tial problems will remain the same. Let's say that Serbia 
wins and takes Croatian land, Croatia will always be eager 
to take that territory back again. Of course, I am very 
worried and I ask myself what can I do. But I'm too old now 
to partidpate in politics. There isn't a sodal demoaatic 
organisation that suits me at the moment and I have no 
desire to serve any particular leadership. 
Many observers today lay the brunt of the blame at the 
feet of the Serbian government. Can one speak of Serbia 
u the aggressor, pressing for a Greater Serbia at the 
territorial expense of the other republics? 
No side is exclusively guilty. During elections last year, the 
leader of the nationalistic Croat party, now Croat President 
Franjo Thdjman, expressed his intention to aeate a Greater 
Croatia. That meant taking parts of Bosnia, as well as Serbia 
and Montenegro. Now, because they have suffered great 
losses on the battlefield, they hope simply to maintain 
Croatia's present frontiers. Under the pretext of defending 
the Serb minority there, the Serbian leadership-and now 
the army too-is attacking some parts of northeastern 
Croatia, where Croats constitute themajorityofthepopula-
tion. From my point of view this is a war of invasion. 
The story is somewhat different in the Krajina region of 
southern Croatia, where Serbs in fact constitute the 
majority. The Serbs there do have a right to some form of 
autonomy which the newly-elected Croat government 
denied them. They felt endangered, and the Serbs are a 
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Milovan Djilas 
people very strongly inclined to rrotect the Serbian 
minority in Croatia. The memories o the Ustashe [World 
War Two Croatian fascists) massacres are still very much 
alive in the Serb consdousness. 
Yet surely Serbia's intentions to impose its hegemony 
over large parts of Yugoslavia has been clear for some 
time now. 
Serbia, as a republic, is not formally involved in the conflict. 
It was the Serbian minority in Croatia that started to revolt 
and the Croatian militia suppressed them. In the beginning, 
the army was more or less neutral. Nevertheless, the Serbs 
can't justify such a large military response. The political 
leadership of I<rajina which, indeed, is backed by Serbia 
seems intent on enlarging its own ethnic territory. They are 
even speaking of the Dalmatian port of Zadar as Serbian. 
The aims of Serbia's President Milosevic are still unclear. 
Although his rhetoric is that of a united Yugoslavia, his 
moves to expand Serbian influence are anti-Yugoslav. But 
that doesn't necessarily mean that he wouldn't settle for 
national rights and autonomy for the Serb minorities in a 
reworked Yugoslavia. I am afraid, however, that he is more 
inclined to enlarge Serbia which implidtly spells war in 
Croatia as well as in neighbouring Bosnia and elsewhere, 
such as the overwhelming ethnic Albanian province of 
Kosovo. If there is a rebellion in Kosovo, Albania itself will 
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go to war. Albania may be weak and demoralised, but 
Albanians in I<osovo are unanimous and intensely in-
spired along national lines. 
Croatia and Slovenia both base their claims to inde-
pendence on the right of nations to self-determln.ttion. 
The application of this right is obviously problematic in 
such ethnially mixed regions as Croatia and Bosnia. But, 
on the other hand, can it be denied? 
Theoretically, everybody has this right but, in practice, we 
are not so free. Neither Croatia nor Bosnia can separate 
without sparking war. If Croatia has the right to self-deter-
mination, say the Serbs, then so does the Serb minority-
and they will elect to join Serbia proper. The republics' 
different positions are all riddled with hypocrisy. While the 
Serbs demand the right to separate from Croatia, they deny 
the same prerogative to the Albanians in I<osovo. Since 
Slovenia is ethnically homogeneous, and her present 
republican frontiers are in harmony with her ethnic bor-
ders, she can berome independent. Macedonia, maybe, can 
too, but it will find itself threatened from the Bulgarian and 
Albanian side as well as Serbian. Frontiers are nearly im-
possible to define within Yugoslavia. But, then, the ques-
tion of borders is the problem of all of Europe, not only 
Yugoslavia. 
A. the war in Croatia has escalated, the federal army has 
intervened with increasing force on behalf of the Serbs. 
How do you explain this development? 
Longer than any other institution in Yugoslavia, the army 
stuck by the old rommunistideology offederal Yugoslavia 
Yet, with time, even it began to understand that this was 
obsolete. The independence drives of the republics 
prompted a belated but parallel disintegration within the 
army. The military hierarchy simply replaced their rom-
munist values with nationalist orientations. Now all 
republics, with the exception of Serbia, insist upon their 
own republican army. The generals from Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnian are actively promoting 
desertion from the army. Thus, although the army is for-
mally Yugoslav, in practice it is ever more Serbian. Under 
the pretext of maintaining a federal Yugoslavia, the army 
is, in fact, backing the Serbs in Croatia. 
The outlook appears so grim. Is a resolution to the crisis 
anywhere in sight? 
Unless some qualitatively new factors arise, I don't see this 
war roming to an end in the near future. At the same time, 
I still don't believe that an all-out Balkan war is inevitable. 
The people are not enthusiastic about the war, even in 
Serbia. 
The European institutions have a key role to play in Yugos-
lavia. The latest decision to hold a peace ronference for 
Yugoslavia is positive. In rontrast to earlier initiatives that 
were empty, this move promises something roncrete. I've 
been extremely disappointed with the European 
diplomacy until now. There haven't been any real achieve-
ments, only propositions, declarations and promises. The 
German and Austrian moves to recognise Slovenian and 
Croatian independence had negative repercussions. On 
the one hand, they encouraged Croats to rontinue the civil 
war as a means to win international recognition. On the 
other hand, the possibility of an independent Croatia only 
frightened the Serb minority further, prompting them to 
step up their revolt. 
How, the~ do you envision the nations and ethnic 
minorities of Yugoslavia Uving together? 
The one way out for Yugoslavia is to move itself towards 
a liberal, democratic state. I envision a completely new 
structure for Yugoslavia-something between federation 
and ronfederation. That means a state organised with com-
pletely independent life for equal republics and, at the 
same time, with a strong centre. The republics must agree 
upon a common army, rommon monetary and foreign 
policy, and rommon guaranteed human rights. 
But isn't it already too late for this? Hasn't a united 
Yugoslavia already been njeded? 
It can't be too late because there isn't any other way to 
avoid all-out war. A structure similar to the one I have in 
mind was basically proposed last month by the presidents 
of Bosnia and Macedonia. All the republican leaders 
agreed but, then, the next day, some of them backed away. 
Yugoslavs watched the recent crisis in the Soviet Union 
withjarticular interest. How have the events there af. 
fecte Yugoslavia? 
It was telling that the Serbian leadership was the only 
government in Europe that didn't rondemn the putsch. In 
a similar boat, the Soviet Union had sheltered Serbia and 
army hardliners. I think Mosrow will now adopt a position 
closer to that of the West Europeans, thus isolating Serbia 
even more. 
Yugoslavia rould use its own Gorbachev today. But neither 
is that person in sight nor, honestly, do I feel that he or she 
rould really rounter the tide of nationalism here. I think 
that the crisis in the Soviet Union will resolve itself more 
easily than in Yugoslavia. 
PAUL HOCKENOS writes for ALR from hil base ia 
Budapest. 
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DESIG I 
to shock 
In the wake of the Soviet coup, Eastern Europe's rapid 
transition to the market has taken a spurt. Reformers are 
determined to make a clean break with the past. But 
Louis Haddad sounds a note of caution. The fast-track 
road to private ownership, he argues, could turn out to be 
just a fast-track to economic chaos. 
I] 
conomic reformers in Eastern and 
Central Europe seem to know exactly 
what they want and where they are 
heading: a well-functioning market 
system of the kind found in developed Western 
countries. Further, they are in a hurry to get there, 
and are in no mood for any experimentation on 
the way lest it leads them into a costly detour or 
dead end. For them and their supporters in the 
IMF there is simply no alternative to the free 
market system. Marxism, socialism, communism 
and even planning are dead and buried in 
Europe. The ideology of marketism has presently 
triumphed over the ideology of communism. 
All the same, having a clear vision of one's goal is one thing; 
getting there is quite another. The transition from central 
planning to the market cannot be effected simply by a 
process of transplanting all the institutions, structures and 
policies of the developed market economies. This is not 
simply because of the legacy of the bureaucratic past; it is 
in the nature of the beast. Systemic changes and institution 
building are not a matter of mechanics, of assembling the 
different components together as in a building. What is 
involved is an organic process that requires time to allow 
the interdependent components mutually to adjust and 
interact with one another in order to get together. 
Anyone who knows anything about the evolution of 
markets in developed countries will be aware of the fact 
that it took decades, if not centuries, for these markets to 
develop and function efficiently and effectively. This is not 
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to deny that the period of transition can be telescoped by 
copying from the developed market economies their in-
stitutions, organisations and policies, through foreign tech-
nical and financial assistance, investment and joint 
ventures, and through sales of state enterprises to foreign 
corporations. These things are helpful and are indeed en-
couraged by the reformers. Of course, the speed of transi-
tion will depend on the circumsta.nces of particular 
countries, on the initial conditions such as the degree of 
decentralisation of dedsion-ma.king, the size of the existing 
private sector and state of the economy, its internal and 
external balance. 
Nevertheless, there is, in principle, an 'optimal' pace of 
reform for each country which should not be artificially 
speeded up or delayed. But in practice the policy-makers 
in Eastern Europe are confronted with the stark choice 
between the application of shock therapies and a se-
quenced, gradual transition. Both strategies have their 
merits and demerits, as I will explain below. 
In general, though, the reformers in Eastern Europe at 
present are in favour of rapid transition to a market-based 
system. In this they are strongly supported by the IMF, the 
World Bank and a number of experts in the West. They all 
reject the gradual approach on historical, political strategic 
and economic grounds. According to them, the gradual 
approach was tried in the past and found wanting. Pre-
vious attempts to reform the planning system in Hungary, 
Poland and elsewhere have met only with a limited degree 
of success. Further, the gradual approach, they argue, 
provides the anti-reformers with ample time to frustrate 
the reform process and ultimately derail it. Furthermore, 
as old habits die hard, it is necessary to administer quick, 
sharp measures in order to force people to change their 
~ng and behaviour. Shock therapies, which are meant 
to cut the Gordian knot of the bureaucratic legacy, can 
shorten the most painful and insecure stage of transforma-
tion. Fmall y, there are economic gains to be got from dis-
mantling the old costly system and replacing it as quickly 
as possible with a well-functioning market system that will 
allocate resources more effectively and generate a higher 
rate of technological innovation. 
The radical reformers are fully aware of the likely danger 
of chaos thatmightfollow the destruction of the old system, 
which did work after some fashion, while the new one is 
being installed, a danger that already exists in the 'Soviet 
Union', Romania and Bulgaria. But to them the risks in-
volved in their strategy are less than those of the gradual 
approach. The reformers and their supporters are also 
aware of the inevitable hardships of market reforms, the 
economic and psychological costs which flow from the 
strategy of rapid transition. However, they believe such 
'adjustment' costs will be temporary and will be more than 
offset by the permanent gains that would accrue from the 
establishment of the market system. With appropriate mac-
roeconomic policies, it is maintained, a recovery from the 
reduced level of output and employment will be possible 
within a relatively short period of time-perhaps a few 
years. As to the human and psychological costs of adjusting 
to market forces, they argue, these can be cushioned by 'a 
social safety net' designed to help the most vulnerable 
segments of the population. Moreover, these costs, it is 
suggested, will be accepted by the population since it is 
widely understood that the old planning system is simply 
unable to deliver a modem progressive economy. The al-
ternative gradual approach would, according to the radical 
reformers, postpone but not avoid the painful costs of 
adjusting to a market economy. 
Ironically, the advocates of rapid transition and shock 
therapies are recommending strategies of rapid in-
dustrialisation which seem oddly similar to the kinds of 
'cultural revolutions' and 'great leaps forward' adopted 
with disastrous consequences by the former communist 
regimes. Historical arguments apply both ways. But what 
is even more astonishing is the dismissal of the gradual 
approach by the managing director of the IMF as having 
no merit other than its "semblance of wisdom". But is it a 
semblance of wisdom to insist on preparing the ground 
before rushing forward, or is it not in facta cardinal blunder 
to ignore the preconditions for a successful and speedy 
transition? And what of the likely hidden costs of hastily 
devising faulty social arrangements, incentives and institu-
tions?lni tial errors committed in a hurry can lead to lasting 
handicaps and deformities. To prevent such deformities it 
may be necessary to spend more time and take special care 
when laying the very foundations of new institutions and 
organisations. However, this should not be used to justify 
unnecessary delays and indifference to the pace of reforms. 
Additionally, shock therapies if applied simultaneously in 
Eastern Europe, as is recommended by the IMF, can ag-
gravate the costs of transition. They will lead to a dramatic 
decline in production, employment, and foreign trade. 
Hundreds of factories which used to produce for one 
another, have closed down as a result of the recent changes 
and shock therapies. Thus, in 1990, Hungary's trade with 
Poland declined by 60%. Was all of this decline an in-
evitable cost of transition? · 
There is yet another danger. Despite the wholesale and 
universal condemnation of the old system of central plan-
ning, there are certain sectors, chiefly the urban transport 
system and agriculture in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
which are quite successful by Western European standards. 
Given the indecent haste with which changes are occur-
ring, there is real danger that the efficient sectors and 
enterprises will be thrown out along with the inefficient. 
Finally, the advocates of rapid transition, despite their 
awareness of the social and human costs of transition, do 
not really face the question of how the needs of those who 
will be adversely affected can be satisfied at a time when 
budgetary deficits and inflation resulting from the 
liberalisation of prices threaten the already meagre resour-
ces devoted to social security. Nor do they face the 
psychological problems of coping with the market, un-
employment and security. The economic reformers have 
not yet set up adequate administrative and advisory 
machineries to help people make the transition. Already, 
new economic crimes have appeared in Eastern Europe 
which are of serious concern to sociologists but not ap-
parently to the market economists. 
ALR: OCTOBEI? 1991 
FEATURES 25 
Vaclav Havel: an ear to tM IMF? 
It would be reassuring, especially for the victims of shock 
therapies, to know if the transitional phase will be as 
short-lived as their advocates believe and whether the 
expected long-term benefits will outweigh the immediate 
oosts. But there can be no certainty about such matters. So 
far, the Polish experience is proving very painful-not-
withstanding the substantial assistance it is receiving from 
abroad. 
It must be noted that the list of institutions, organisations 
and pre-oonditions for a workable market system, which 
we take for granted, seems endless. It includes, among 
other things, a legal system to protect private property and 
enforce market contracts, a regulatory framework that 
includes trade practices, the creation of financial institu-
tions, an accounting and auditing system, bankruptcy 
laws, extensive privatisation of enterprises, government 
statistics that meet the needs of market and macro-
eoonomic policies and a corresponding infrastructure to 
formulate and administer stabilising policies, and last and 
(perhaps the most difficult for the Eastern European 
countries) a new army of accountants, lawyers, bankers, 
managers and entrepreneurs to enable the market 
eoonomy to work well. 
A few of these requirements can be implemented simul-
taneously in a relatively short period of time. The great 
bulk of them will take a good deal longer. The process of 
privatisation, for example, will not be short and easy, even 
if all the legal rules of ownership and property rights have 
been formulated and passed to speed up the transition. 
In Eastern Europe it is now widely, if not universally, 
accepted that privatisation is needed for the orderly 
functioning of a market, and thatmarketisation will not be 
completed without a substantial degree of privatisation 
involving most of the economy. This belief is buttressed by 
the observation that no well-developed Western economy 
has more than one-third of its labour force employed in the 
public sector and that recently there has been a general 
trend towards privatisation in Western countries. The 
debate over privatisation now centres on the optimal speed 
and timing (ie, whether it should proceed or follow other 
reforms),notonthenecessityofprivateownershipinitself. 
There are other subsidiary questions relating to the criteria 
to be used for deciding which firms will be offered for sale, 
to whom and at what price. 
Harvard University's Professor Jeffery Sachs has recently 
argued that "accelerating privatisation is the number one 
priority in Eastern Europe" and that "if there is no 
breakthroughintheprivatisationoflargeenterprisesinthe 
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near future the entire process of reform would be stalled 
for years to come with dire consequences". In Sachs' view, 
failure to privatise quickly means that governments will 
continue to be deeply involved in the affairs of state 
enterprises and their attention will be deflected from the 
bigger problems of building the infrastructure and reform-
ing the economic institutions. Further, corporatisation or 
anrunerdalisation of state enterprises, he argues, will not 
work in the highly political climate of Eastern Europe. 
Thus, he rejects the idea of oommerdalising enterprises 
before privatising them: "one must forget about putting 
enterprises in shape before privati sing them; the idea is to 
prlvatise them and solve the problems of enterprises, not 
the other way round". 
The strategy of privatising first and quickly overlooks a 
number of fundamental problems, of which the most im-
portant is to decide on the value of the assets to be sold. It 
is easy to argue that privatisation is needed to create proper 
markets (in particular a capital market) but, in the absenre 
of such markets, privatisation cannot proceed on a rational 
basis. A capital market is needed to generate meaningful 
valuations of assets without which product pria!S would 
not reflect the real oosts of all resoura!S used in their 
production. Thus the strategy of privatisation first without 
developing other market-related institutions can lead to 
waste and distortion. 
Moreover, rapid privatisation of state enterprises provides 
opportunity for corruption and abuse. Some people will 
join the tenant's 
association 
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get very rich as a result, while others will beoome un-
employed. The difficulty of evaluating the assets of an 
enterprise before the establishment of a capital market 
gives enterprise managers considerable room for 
manoeuvre in drawing up sale oontracts. In Hungary, 
during the early phase of 'spontaneous privatisation', a 
number of state firms were bought by their (formerly 
oommunist) managers at very low prires. More seriously, 
there have been buy-outs by former elites with no prior 
experienre in production or marketing. It is unlikely that 
such privatisation will bring much economic benefit to 
society, even if the problem of equity is ignored. 
An argument that is sometimes encountered in Eastern 
Europe is that rapid privatisation should proceed at once 
even though state assets might be sold below their market 
valuations: "put it down on the bill as one more but final 
oost of 40 years of oommunist misrule". The cost of diS~IUU~­
tling the old system, acoording to this view, is beside the 
point. It does not even matter if former party officials, 'the 
nomenklatura' now beoome owners. What matters is not 
the owner but the function of ownership. Any real profit 
maximiser is better than no owner at all. 
Such attitudes explain why there has been little fuss about 
who owns what. It does not seem to bother these advocates 
of the rapid path that 20% of public property in Poland has 
already been converted into private ownership of former 
elites. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, enterprise elites of the 
old order are using the new measures of privatisation to 
retain managerial positions in the restructured firms and 
in joint ventures with foreign companies. While this 
provides an element of continuity and stability, it al10 
carries the danger of perpetuating old habits of doing 
business. it is possible, of course, that the 'new' elites will 
behave differently as they will be working under different 
rules of the game. However, one would not want to count 
on it. 
Another argument against rapid privatisation is that it 
might lead to a disproportionate share of state assets ill 
foreign ownership. Given the very low ratio of domestic 
savings to public assets, rapid sales of state enterprises 
would tend to favour foreign buyers. Curiously, however, 
there is in Eastern Europe at present, little concern about 
the dangers of foreign ownership. On the contrary, there II 
a good deal of enthusiasm for it. In Hungary, for exampll, 
it is reoommended that sales of state enterprises to foreign-
ers be encouraged as a means of reducing the foreign debt 
which, in per capita terms, is one of the highest in tbl 
world. Equally, foreign ownership is welcomed because It 
would bring in much needed managerial and organilao 
tional talents, new technologies, and provide international 
markets for domestic products. Moreover, the presence 
foreign firms will provide direct competition and will haw 
favourable demonstration effects. Given these perceived 
advantages of foreign ownership, it is not surprising that 
new foreign investment laws in Eastern Europe 
preferential treatment to foreign producers. The new 
offer lower tax rates on profits and larger tax holidays 
foreign and joint ventures than to local producers. 
ALl : OCTOBER 1991 
Another dimension of the problem of privatisation that the 
reformers must face is the issue of concentrated versus 
dispersed ownership. Proposals have been made in East-
em Europe to give the workers shares in their own 
enterprises and/or to give the citizens shares in state 
enterprises which they can keep or sell to one another or to 
Institutions. Critics of these proposals argue that worker-
ownership delays the much needed restructuring of old 
and obsolete industries. Moreover, the dilution of owner-
lhip would reduce both the interest of shareholders in 
enterprises and management's accountability to share 
owners. In any case, it seems in Hungary, at least, the 
problem has been resolved in favour of concentrated 
ownership. The Hungarian Law on Business Association 
which was passed at the beginning of 1989 has the effect of 
promoting concentrated rather than dispersed ownership. 
The law sets the minimum price of a share in joint-stock 
a>mpanies at one million forints (A$1=55 forints). In addi-
tion, the law exempts from taxation part of the income of 
those who participate in such companies. Clearly, under 
these arrangements, the rich will get richer. Quite apart 
from the question of equity, though, the effective exclusion 
of workers from the opportunity to purchase the property 
that they might see as in some sense their creation, could 
lead to mstability if the legitimacy of the new ownership 
has not been demonstrated ethically. 
Yet another important argument against rapid privatisa-
tion is that it might leave inadequate time for the creation 
of durable incentive structures for efficiency. Without 
market liberalisation many of the state-owned enterprises 
would simply be transformed into private monopofies as 
happened with some privatisation in Hungary. It may be 
possible to subject the newly privatised enterprises to 
foreign competition. But it seems more logical to promote 
a>mpetition first to establish more realistic price signals 
that can be used by the state to restructure the enterprises, 
and to privatise them afterwards. 
Finally, rapid privatisation is likely to reduce the revenue 
from the sale of state assets if the supply exceeds the 
demand. In any case, given the shortage of managers and 
entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe, it is pointless to rush into 
privatisation. It is unlikely that the newly privatised 
enterprises would be managed by people with the required 
sldlls. There would be little to gain in efficiency from the 
whole process. On the other hand, slower, more deliberate 
and controlled privatisation will improve the chances that 
enterprises will be managed by those who can prove their 
ability in the newly emerging market economies. In short, 
before rapid privatisation can proceed on a large scale, it is 
necessary to train the various types of manager required 
for a well-functioning market system. 
It is quite clear that reformers in Eastern Europe are faced 
with some difficult dilemmas in their choice of the pace and 
sequence of reforms. On the one hand, they want to see 
their economies market-driven as soon as possible-partly 
for political reasons (to stop the anti-reformers from inter-
fering with the process of transition) and partly for 
strategic reasons (to shake the populations out of their old 
habits). There are also the economic benefits of dismantling 
the old costly system and installing the more efficient 
FEATURES 27 
market system in the shortest possible period. On the other 
hand, rapid transition carries the danger of increasing 
costs, both economic and human. It is also likely to lead to 
faulty institutions and second best solutions. There are 
definite disadvantages in moving very rapidly in some 
areas if the preconditions have not been established. Haste 
for the radical reformers has a logic but it has also enor-
mous costs. 
Alternatively, a gradual strategy on the one hand could 
minimise the costs of transition and, more importantly, 
would be likely to lead to the establishment of sound 
institutions and social arrangements, simply because more 
care and thought could be taken in building the founda-
tions. Of course, a gradual approach might be used as an 
excuse for procrastination and unnecessary delays, and 
vested interest groups may succeed in frustrating the 
reform process. Unnecessary delays can also lead to missed 
opportunities. Tune is required to formulate sound policies 
and make crucial decisions, but the timeliness of decisions 
is also important. 
Accordingly, while it might be desirable to dismantle the 
old system as quickly as possible in order to make way for 
the new market system, it is in the nature of systemic 
changes that they require sufficient time to be established 
and function well. Not all the required changes can be 
implemented simultaneously. The dilemma of logical se-
quencing has been illustrated with the problem of 
privatisation. The problem of sequencing can be solved 
more satisfactorily if sufficient time is taken to introduce 
the other related market institutions. 
In short, it seems to me, on the whole, that a gradual 
approach is preferable. Rapid transition may not be the 
road to a well-functioning market, but a costly detour. The 
headlong speed with which Eastern European countries, 
notably Poland, are heading towards the market-a 
strategy urged on them by the IMF and other economists 
in the West--does not guarantee that the new system will 
function well. 
The success of the economy depends not just on how 
markets work but also on how well economic organisations 
work, and on the wisdom of the policymakers, their crea-
tive and refined skill of managing the economy. The failure 
of the planning system in Eastern Europe, after all, was due 
in large measure to the failure of planners. 
LOUIS HADDAD teaches in economics at Sydney Univer-
sity. 
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As the tank tracks fade, commentators have put the 
spotlight on Gorbachev' s responsibility for the August 
Soviet coup. Graeme Gill thinks history will be rather 
kinder to Mikhail Sergeyevich. 
[i 
he attempted Soviet coup in August 
raises many questions about the course 
of reform in an authoritarian system. 
Among these questions, one of the 
most important is the charge made against Gor-
bachev by many in the West, as well as by some 
prominent figures in the USSR, that he was at 
least indirectly responsible for the coup. 
This argument has two main variants. The first, most 
recently enunciated by Eduard Shevardnadze, is that Gor-
bachev had been warned about the coup, and had failed to 
take action to counter it This view, which focuses upon the 
presumed lack of judgement of Gorbachev, has some 
weight, but it concerns the immediate events triggering the 
coup and tells us nothing about the underlying forces 
which brought the coup about. 
The second sort of argument relates to the role Gorbachev 
has played in the reform process since his election in 1985, 
and is reflected in many of the criticisms made of him by 
radical democrats in the Soviet Union in the last couple of 
years. The heart of this argument is the charge that, ewr 
since coming to power, Gorbachev has temporised, reful. 
ing to take the radical measures necessary decisively to 
break with the past. Instead of forging an alliance with the 
more radical proponents of reform and using this to font 
through substantial change, he has preferred to introdum 
half measures which have had the effect both of leadillf 
reform into a blind alley and enabling anti-reform fot'Ca 
to consolidate their positions. This raises the more general 
question of the role of the centrist in the introduction of 
reform. Is the centrist doomed to fail both personally and 
in effectively guiding society through the shoals of reform 
to a new future? 
Since his election as General Secretary in March 1985, 
Gorbachev has been on a steep learning curve. His initial 
prescriptions about what was needed to overoome the 
Soviet crisis were soon superseded by more radical solu-
tions, and this process of radicalisation has continued. Oal 
need only compare the sorts of policies he favoured IOCID 
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after coming to power with those he has espoused in the 
last 12 months. In the economic sphere, he has moved from 
favouring a streamlining of the central command system, 
to support for replacement of that system by one based on 
the market. Politically, he has moved from support for the 
oontinued leadership role of a monolithic communist party 
to a situation in which that party is to be at the most only 
one of a number of parties within a democratic structure. 
:..-= 
~-~F 
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But the radicalisation of the Gorbachev program has not 
proceeded smoothly, but in fits and starts. Two factors seem 
to have been significant in this. 
The first is the limit to Gorbachev's own vision. The 
General Secretary was a product of the system in the sense 
that he had risen to prominence by way of an orthodox 
career through the party apparatus. But unlike many of his 
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ooUeagues, he retained a capadty and willingness to ques-
tion much of what he saw. Ultimately, that meant question-
ing aU that he had stood and worked for throughout his life. 
Each step away from that past was difficult and painful. It 
is little wonder, therefore, that his own personal odyssey 
should be characterised by hesitation and doubt, but it is 
also a measure of the man that he has been able to adjust 
and to meet the changing demands made upon him. 
The seoond, which may in part flow from the first, is the 
broad strategy of reform which Gorbachev has adopted. He 
seems to have had a oonscious strategy at each stage of 
moving only as far as was compatible with not completely 
alienating oonservative elements in the leadership. These 
oonsiderations have meant that the advances have been 
partial and inadequate in the eyes of the reformists, while 
being excessive in the eyes of the conservatives, which 
explains why Gorbachev was distrusted by both sides. 
Gorbachev's centrist role 
was essential to the 
reformers' survival 
One charge against Gorbachev made by both reformers and 
conservatives is that his measures have led to the 
downward spiral of the Sovieteoonomy and the disintegra-
tion of society. For the conservatives, these resulted from 
the implementation of fundamentally misguided measures 
which disrupted basically healthy structures and processes. 
For the reformers, they reflect the failure to push through 
the needed reforms, thereby neither oompletely transcend-
ing existing structures, nor putting in place new ones to 
displace them. There is some truth in both of these charges. 
The effect of Gorbachev' s measures was often to create 
oonfusion and to disrupt the operation of existing struc-
tures and processes, oontributing directly to the erosion of 
the established oommand structure, without putting any-
thing effective in its place. 
AU of this had a deleterious effect on economic performance 
and social cohesion and harmony. Of course it isn't clear 
that in the absence of such measures, similar results would 
not have been attained by the general process of economic 
decay which had made reform necessary in the first place. 
Nor is it certain that more radical measures would have 
produced different results. However, Gorbachev's role 
should not be seen only in this negative light It may be 
argued that the Gorbachevian centrist strategy was in fact 
the saviour of the whole reform program. The ultimate aim 
of the radical reformers, a democratic political system 
based on a market economy, could not be achieved without 
the destruction of the old system. 
But that destruction was not something that could be 
achieved easily. The value of the centrist strategy is that It 
kept both oonservatives and radicals in the game while the 
position of the former was being eroded and that of the 
latter strengthened. Gorbachev thereby provided a shield 
for the reformists until their power and position had been 
oonsolidated sufficiently to enable them to rebuff the in-
evitable conservative reaction when it came. Had the coup 
been mounted in 1989, the result would have been verry 
different That it did not occur until the middle of 1991 il 
partly a function of the role played by Gorbachev in lceep-
ing the conservatives on side. 
The radical democrat may respond that Gorbachev oould 
have decisively tilted the balance in a reformist direction 
earlier by unambiguously cutting his ties with the oonser· 
vatives and throwing his weight firmly behind radical 
reform. But this runs into the problem of vision noted 
above. By pursuing his centrist path, Gorbachev had effec. 
tively deprived himself of a firm power base. By failinJ~ 
submit to popular election in 1989 or early 1990, he la 
popular legitimacy. The party he headed and the legislatwt 
of which he was chair were both overwhelmingly oonser-
vative in disposition and therefore oould not constitute 1 
real power base for a reformist leader. 
He oould not play the nationalist card like Yeltsin, and the 
fledgling democratic movement lacked the sort of organisa-
tional structure which oould act as a base for him. Even the 
presidency, with the enhanced formal powers it gained iJI 
1990, was deficient in this regard -as Gorbachev's in-
ability to ensure implementation of his decrees showa. 
Given these oonstraints, his strategy makes some sense. 
If the above argument is accurate, the centrist role played 
by Gorbachev was essential to the survival of reformism 
and the failure of the conservative attaclc. It does not assUDII 
that this was a clearly-defined game plan by Gorbachev.) 
may be that he sought to play his balancing role in order to 
defend the reformists while they gathered strength, skilful. 
ly tacking to the oonservatives when necessary in ordertbl 
better to protect the reform process. There is no evideNI 
that this was how Gorbachev saw the situation. Indeed,d 
of his public statements suggest that he believed that hil 
centrist course would ultimately be successful; his belief Ia 
the reformability of the communist party reflects this viet~ 
Nevertheless, objectively, his role did have this effect 
AU of the aforegoing is now history. Now, in the wake ol 
the defeat of the coup, with the oonservative forces dJI. 
credited, there can be no excuse for continuing on with& 
centrist course. The coup seems to have openecl 
Gorbachev's eyes to the real limits of the attempt to all> 
tinue to carry the conservatives with the process of reform. 
It must now be apparent that only full rommitment ID 
reform can produce the results to which he aspires. Thetiml 
of the centrist, while essential to the success of the radkal 
reformers, has now passed. 
GRAEME GILL teaches in the Department of Govmullllll 
at the Univenity of Sydney. 
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Russian 
COUP 
In the wake of the Soviet drama, many observers 
concluded that the coup plotters were half-hearted from the 
start. Peter Feeney concludes that, on the contrary, they 
were determined and ruthless, but just too late. 
or many observers the biggest surprise 
of the attempted 'coup' in the USSR 
was not that it happened but that it fell 
apart so rapidly. Tentative explanations 
have emphasised the sloppiness and stupidity of 
the coup leaders, and contrasted it with Yeltsin's 
near-faultless performance and the undoubted 
bravery of those youths in Moscow who 
demonstrated their willingness to risk all for 
their belief in Russia's, till now, faltering and 
uneven progress out of totalitarianism. 
But stupidity and people-power could have been counter-
balanced at any time by a massive and pitiless show of 
force. The failure of the self-proclaimed Emergency Com-
mittee to ensure obedience via repression was not the result 
of humanitarian restraints. The oommittee was let down 
by its own security forces-the army, the KGB and the 
MVD (Internal Ministry)--and the roup leaders' hesita-
tion, dissension and ignominious end are all attributable 
to this failure. 
The possibility of military interference in the reform 
process in the USSR haunted observers of perestroika from 
the beginning. Nevertheless the likelihood of independent 
military action against perestroika, a coup d'etat, pure and 
simple, was always slender. Excepting 1917, when the 
remaining original fragment of the old Tsarist Imperial 
Army was swept aside by its disaffected rank and file, there 
had been no tradition in Russia of direct military interven-
tion in politics. More importantly, the process of glasnost 
and perestroika were, from 1985, increasingly maldng in· 
roads into the military's integrative forces of discipline and 
solidarity. As perestroika proceeded it became more and 
more obvious that the Red Army, just as the rest of society, 
was divided within itself, and therefore lacked the institu-
tional solidarity to act alone. 
From late in 1990 a second scenario did look more 
plausible. This was the possibility of the military acting as 
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the backbone to a rombined ronservative reassertion. On 
the face of it such a reassertion stood a fair chance of 
success. Top military leaders shared with li}(e..minded 
creatures in the KGB and party apparatus a dislike of the 
changes wrought by perestroika, and a veritable horror of 
the changes to rome. Their institutional power-bases were 
discredited but still largely unreformed and-at least on 
paper-still powerful. These ronservatives had potential 
allies among traditionalist forces in society: blue rollar 
workers fed up with constant and aimless social upheaval, 
servile peasants, military-industrialist employees fearful 
of their privileges, and so on. Such a roalition might sum-
mon up the legitimacy to reassure waverers in the army. 
The ronservatives had already had their dress rehearsal in 
the crackdown of January 1991. Then, as on previous oc-
casions ('lbilisi and Uthuania), elements within the army 
proved themselves positively eager to crush civilian resis-
tance. 
The roup leaders believed that their appeal would extend 
beyond the dusty bulwarks of the old order they repre-
sented to reach a largish chunk of the public. Their assump-
tion was a sound one given the psychological exhaustion 
of the Soviet people. There have been no shortage of public 
opinion surveys that have charted a growing public yearn-
ing for order throughout the USSR. This is not to suggest 
that crowds were ever likely to throng the streets in support 
of the State of Emergency; rather the committee was gam-
bling on tacit acceptance. By immediately promising an 
end to shortages, ration coupons, rising prices, and the 
housing crisis the emergency rommittee demonstrated its 
sensitivity to the mounting anger in society over the in-
creasing difficulty of everyday living. The roup leadership 
was also counting on the unpopularity of Gorbachev and 
the inability of the democrats to work together in the past. 
The rounter-argument to the rommittee's thinking is that 
the Soviet Union is no longer a suitable subject for 
totalitarian rule: the polity is better educated, less 
homogeneous and more aware of the importance of 
democraticfreedoms. Thesetraitsare,however,notincom-
patiblewith the kind of 'wait and see' attitude that the coup 
conspirators gambled on. Even the intelligentsia who 
physically defended Yeltsin see him not as the national 
saviour but a man who, despite his serious faults, repre-
sents the only alternative to Gorba~ev. at is precisely 
because Yeltsin was for so long the only credible opposition 
to Gorbachev that groups of widely divergent views have 
been attracted to shelter under his umbrella. Now that he 
has become involved in the sordid business of actually 
governing we should expect his political support and 
popularity to diminish somewhat.) 
So, on the whole, the rommittee's gamble on the public 
mood was well founded (excluding some difficult 
republics such as Georgia and the Baltics). On the whole, 
active resistance was left to a very small number of 
politicians and intellectuals. It was the fact that these 
figures for several days were seen to be able to go about 
their business unmolested that overcame people's fears 
and brought them out onto the streets. The longer-term 
durability of the coalition of social forces which the junta 
hoped to champion was left unexplored. 
Along with people-power, plain old inrompetence has also 
been suggested as an explanation for the coup's failure. Yet 
both charges actually have their roots in the failure of the 
coercive organs that the roup leaders relied on. Stupidity 
is a difficult factor to quantify, but there is no amount of it 
that a good dose of ruthlessness cannot rectify. 
The roup had actually been carefully planned to strike hard 
at centres of potential opposition, while still maintaining 
the pretence of legality. The willingness to descend into 
brutality was there, but the means were lacking. The junta 
was able to make some arrests, but only of lesser figures, 
while important person&-Sobchak, Popov, Kalugin and 
Yeltsin-were left alone. The resultant feebleness of the 
media crackdown, in the absence of reliable troops to 
enforce it, was particularly damaging. Had a curfew been 
imposed on Monday instead of Wednesday, and the media 
gagged, Russians would have been left isolated, unin· 
formed and leaderless. 
The failure of the coercive organs might seem surprising 
since the coup leadership represented a core of conserva· 
tives grouped within centralised, roercive organisations: 
the party, f<GB, military-industrial complex, and the Min· 
istry of the Interior (MVD). The problem was that this 
hard-line consensus at the top simply did not exist at lower 
levels of the hierarchies the ronservatives led. 
Until the time of the coup, officers and conscripts alike in 
the armed forces remained restricted to a monotonous diet 
of anti-perestroika articles in much of the military press. 
Despite this (or because of it?) the bifurcation in attitudes 
between senior and lower ranking officers was very 
marked, ronstituting a fault-line running contrary to in-
tegrative forces of discipline and institutional solidarity 
within the armed forces. Numerous surveys indicated that 
the majority of the officer corps at the grass roots level wu 
aligned with civilian reformers on the question of radical 
military reform including-despite the fact that 75% of the 
officer corps was, until recently, rommunist-the issue of 
depoliticisation. In addition, the army had quite literally 
been under attack from perestroika for many years. Bytbl 
time of the roup its morale and prestige was at a near-alii-
cal low. There were powerful anti-military sentiments 
among the young, in many ways reminiscent of Ameri<l 
during Vietnam; discipline was poor, with 250,000 
weapons 'lost' in 1989 alone; junior officers and NCO. 
shared the social burdens of the people, and many of them 
were recently returned from service in Eastern Europe" 
atrocious living ronditions back home. The bulk of tlw 
army was therefore of highly questionable value to tilt 
junta. H pressed to do the work of internal policing 
army units would have been rent asunder between 
ronflicting loyalties of family, nationality, military 
and basic principles of democracy. 
The forces of the Ministry of the Interior were POI:enHIJI 
the junta's most loyal troops. In Moscow, the 
Dzerzhinsky Division (10,000 strong) remained 
ciplined, but reluctant to move on Yeltsin. The 
surprise came from the KGB-the happy 
centralism one might have thought-which turned 
be fragmented not just on generational lines but 
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ones as well. The KGB top leadership in Moscow sup-
ported the coup but officers lower down deliberately 
sabotaged their directives. The KGB had also begun to 
exhibit territorial sympathies. The Leningrad KGB 
ded.ared against the coup; KGB officers of the Lefortovo 
Eson in Moscow referred to Kryuchkov and his crew as 
aenile reptiles". Ordinary police retained strong local 
sympathies in defianCl! of the committee's wishes (the core 
of Yeltsin' s defence fora! was initially policemen). A great 
many army commanders remained neutral throughout 
Many may have been sympathetic to the conservative 
cause, but aware of the disunity among their troops were 
unwilling to risk active involvement 
In the long run, obedienCl! to the emergency committee 
could have been restored via extensive personnel sackings, 
but of course there was not time. In all arms of the security 
apparatus the chain of command tended to disintegrate at 
the middle and lower levels. The rot of perestroika had 
come to infect the armed forces and even, so it turned out, 
the KGB. Unfortunately for them the coup leadership only 
appears to have discovered these weaknesses after the 
coup began. 
On the operational side the key to the success of the 
conservatives' gamble was that popular resistanCl! should 
be minimal, and that any such resistanCl! that did aop up 
be snuffed out fast by special troops. This would allow the 
bulk of the dtizen army to remain in the barracks with their 
conflicting loyalties (to uniform, family, republic and the 
constitution) safely untested. If neither of these two condi-
tions were met a large chunk of the army, with its doubtful 
loyalties, would become involved. The result could be dvil 
war. 
The coup thus called for an accurate judgment of the 
public's mood and the utmost in ruthlessness from the 
coup leadership once committed. As !have argued the first 
condition would have held if the second had been applied. 
It was not This was not through lack of trying but simply 
because the troops who were counted on turned out to be 
unreliable. Special troops-of the KGB or MVD-were 
always more likely to obey orders. They should have been 
turned to early, on the night of the 19th-20th, when there 
was a chance theymightdo so. Regular troops should have 
been left right out of the action. 
The coup leadership was obviously badly out of touch with 
the mood of the organisations they led. But there is a 
further explanation for their overestimation of the 
reliability of the security apparatus, and that is that pre-
viously elements of it had performed well. In January in 
lithuania the Black Berets had spilt blood without waver-
ing. And in Moscow in March 50,000 men of all branches 
of the security forces had controlled pro-Yeltsin protests. 
In the former case, however, the operation had been small-
scale; the latter operation had been conducted clearly 
within the bounds of the law. 
AtT'umarunen in 1989, conservative communists were con-
tent to destroy the flower of China's youth in order to 
protect their selfish prerogatives. Arguably, that willing-
ness was also present in Moscow last August within the 
emergency committee. Disturbingly, only a very few, and 
relatively young, army commanders-Kobets, Shaposh· 
nikov (Air Force) and Grachev (paratroops)-<ame out 
early against the coup; very many officers of the rank ol 
colonel and above, judging from opinion polls taken prior 
to the coup, must have sympathised with the emergency 
committee. But, despite these attitudes, the bulk of the 
army, whatever its views, remained true to tradition, and 
sat out the coup on the sidelines. This neutrality may juJt 
have easily worked out to the junta's advantage, had they 
been more ruthless, more decisive and more lucky. 
The outcome of the coup has been a profound vindication 
of the process of perestroika. Although that process never 
envisaged the complete emasculation of the party that 
occurred following the coup, it did nurture the power ol 
the democratic movement and undermined the effective-
ness of the forces of coerdon, breaking down their chain ol 
command. 
Perestroika is now unequivocally over, and the USSR loob 
primed for thorough-going change (assisted, one hopes, by 
the West). Nevertheless, the Red Army as a prominent 
Soviet institution is not about to disappear. Thanks to the 
committee's bungling, the forces of conservatism in Soviet 
society seem to have well and truly cooked their goose. By 
contrast, the prestige of the armed forces may have 
recovered somewhat thanks to its actions-or rather inao-
tions-during the coup. In fact, with the attack on the party 
which followed the rout of the conspirators, the army 
remains, alongside the infant democracies in the 
Republics, about the only credible pre-perestroika institu-
tion left. This is a problem because in its own way the Soviet 
military's sheer institutional weight is as much an obstacle 
to change as the conservatives or party were. Soviet sodety 
still devotes by peacetime standards an obscene amount of 
its resources to military productions: the Red Army evea 
now maintains a standing complement of four milliOD 
troops, 21% of the best and brightest of the USSR's ID-
dustrial workforce works in defence industries, and per-
haps as much as 15% of GNP (up to half the all-Uni011 
budget) goes on defence spending. 
The time is overdue to take on this resource-hun817 
leviathan but this remains a complex task. The militaJy'l 
new post-coup leadership were promoted on the groundl 
of loyalty, which is not always the same as liberalism. 
linked problems of military reform and a reduction in 
defenCl! budget together represent a major obstacle to 
ther reform. The end of the centralised Union may 
the break-up and destruction, piecemeal, of this 
colossus. Then again, if the break-up is 
tension, defence spending is likely to remain 
the involvement of so many of the top brass in 
coup, much of what the Red Army has come to 
during perestroika may be preserved in a oo:)t-commw• 
environment for some time to come. 
PETER FEENEY is a researcher in the Centre for """w""" ·-
East European Studies at Melbourne University. 
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Greens in 
THE POST 
The Left nowadays loves the green movement, but isn't 
nearly so sure about postmodernism. That's odd, thinks 
McKenzie Wark, because the two have more in common 
than is often imagined. 
m owadays, when most people hear the word postmodem they probably reach for the remote control to flip channels as fast as possible. But please indulge 
me here, because I want to argue that it is a buzz 
word on which the battery hasn't entirely gone 
fla~ as it gives us a handle on the rise of the green 
movement. 
What does green politics have to do with postmodernism? 
What do either have to do with the traditional interests and 
concerns of the left? In the case of a lot of green politics, 
quite a lot it would seem. Most of the Left has rushed to 
annex most of the green politics which have sprung up 
around it on the grounds that the Left has always been 
concerned about the environment and can stake some claim 
to have had a hand in nurturing the nascent green move-
ment for many years before its current flowering. 
On the other hand, many on the Left take great pains ID 
distance themselves from anything remotely 
'postmodem'. I can remember hysterical tirades againlt 
postmodemism from the floor of the first conference of 
Socialist Scholars held in Sydney a year ago. Postmoder-
nism seemed to have become at that moment the g.t 
fearful 'other' of that distinctively leftist kind of paranoll. 
This kind of paranoia might be justified when the enemr 
one fears and attacks is unchecked capitalism, the casull 
violence of bureaucracies, patriarchal violence, or any mort 
of a number of solid traditional Left fears and hates. But 
postmodemism? How does a vaguely-defined style of .. 
chitecture, philosophy and video clip decor add up 
something as fearful as all that? 
The reason for the hysterical reaction to postmodemismby 
the Left seems to me to stem from the fact that postmoder-
nism is a genuine outgrowth of leftist thinking, one 
got more than a bit out of control. Postmodemism, 
green movement, has some things which it holds in 
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mon with the Left, and some which it doesn't. The dif-
ference is that while the Left wants to claim more of the 
green movement than it can comfortably accommodate, it 
wants to hack out postmodem thinking root and branch. 
On the face of it, this looks sensible. Environmentalism is 
good, solid, morally sound stuff. Real politics. Even, if you 
can pardon the often unacknowledged pun, a grassroots 
movement. On the other hand, postmodemism is a bunch 
of amdemics, artists, media brats and pop musicians doing 
weird things with ideas no-one understands, cui tural tech-
nologies everyone is afraid of or insidious Yank pop cul-
ture. A very mixed bag, but all of it bad. What seems to 
have esmped attention up until now is that these seeming-
ly polar opposite aspects of contemporary culture and 
politics might actually be deeply related to each other. 
Even, as we used to say, 'dialectically' implied in each 
other. This is the idea I want to develop here. 
Postmodemism appears as a set of descriptions of surface 
details which are either celebrated or denounced, depend-
ing on one's taste--and often it is little more than taste that 
is involved. Yet these surface details seem to me to point to 
something quite fundamental. Capitalism is an open-
ended system, a 'perpetuum mobile', as Marx called it. It 
constantly develops new forces, not only of production but 
of communication as well. If the postmodem amounts to 
anything much, it is an intuition that the development of 
the vectors of communication has not only led to a quan-
titative increase in the volume and velocity of information 
in circulation, but it has also had qualitative effects on 
culture itself. Increasingly, everyday experience, historical 
memory, world events, subcultural or ethnic identities are 
all mediated through a vast and global network of media 
vectors, which is growing in influence and strength relative 
to all the traditional structures which circulated, 
developed, or preserved cultural forms. 
I'll give an example. As the last federal election showed the 
influence of green politics and culture on public opinion is 
broad but shallow. Many, many people feel instinctively 
that the green perspective is fundamentally right. They 
might not have a clear idea how the whole shebang comes 
together, but they know something is rotten in the state of 
the world. They feel strongly about the destruction of 
rainforests, the termination of whole species, especially 
cuddly ones, and even more strongly about things which 
affect them personally, like the quality of air and water. 
They may not be prepared to sacrifice either of the family 
mrs yet, but they're beginning to feel guilty enough to buy 
the unbleached toilet paper they saw on TV. 
This last is the crudal determinant here: people react to 
green issues because they have seen them on TV. The green 
movement has had influence out of all proportion to ita 
actual organisational size, in large part because of 
television. This comes in part from a consdous use of 1V 
politics. Taking a few pages out of Saul Alinsky and the 
yippies' traininS manuals, a number of green movements 
have developed a highly effective form of direct action 
which does not always directly stop the bastards from 
bulldozing everything in sight on the ground but which 
gets hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions, of people 
thinking that the greens are probably right-and all 
through directly invading the terrain of television. 
Sometimes they don't even have to organise meticulously 
planned and heroic actions to produce this effect. An oil 
tanker or a nuclear power plant cracking up is a propagan-
da coup all on its own. Incremental erosion of our condl· 
tions of life has very little effect on how people think. 
Someone once told me that you can put a frog in a pot of 
water on the stove and that, if you raise the temperature in 
the pot slowly enough, the frog simply adj~sts its body 10 
the temperature change as if it's normal until, voila/ Boiled 
frog. I think this is exactly the effect that the idea of 1 
football field worth of rainforest disappearing every 
second has on people. We can listen to stuff like that untU 
we're boiled frogs. A good, violent disaster, on the other 
hand, makes sense. 
The third source of green consciousness in popular cult\111 
is fictional narrative and documentaries. I lump that 
together bemuse I think their effect is much the same. 
When they work, they tell a story which people can relata 
to, get angry about, but not feel powerless about as a result. 
The great critical theorist Theodor Adorno once said thlt 
the most important thing is not to let the power of others, 
or our own powerlessness, stupefy us. He said that in the 
context of World WarlWo and theholomust, butitismort 
true today. The dark side of the enlightenment Adorno 
feared is alive and well. It dominates nature and people 
alike with its technologies of extraction and rontrol. Yeti 
well-aimed narrative like The Emertlld Forest or Silkwootlor 
The China Syndrome can make you feel not only that somto 
thing is wrong but that something can be done. 
In sum, the green movement is effective becauseittouct. 
people's vital interests and attacks forms of power that Ill 
demonstrably wrong. This is why very small 01 
have had such an enormous effect on popular conSdOIIJio 
ness. Yet the means through which it has its effects 
been-shock, horror-thoroughly postmodem. The 
movement is a postmodem movement in that it 
its effects on its power within the sphere of popular 
culture. 
It may be argued that the green movement is 'reelly' 
small, dedicated band of people organised in ...... ecanlllll 
organisations. This is indeed true, but such o~;anisatillll 
only produce effects bemuse they are taken up in 
sphere. Whereas most powerful forces occupy spaa! 
media in proportion to their organisational power 
the greens do it through the staging of spectacular 
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through the telling of effective stories and through the 
bock-on effects of the inevitable disasters caused by the 
ldDd of insane exploitation of people and nature that passes 
for dvilisation. 
lflnce, to understand green poll tics and to practise it effoo-
tlwly; we need to understand the workings of the terrain 
Cll which it draws mass support and legitimacy. This might 
lllo help in the struggle against the co-option of the motifs 
IDd images thrown off by the interaction of green politics 
end popular mnsdousness by business interests. 
'Greenness' seems like nothing more than a kind of 
product diHerentiation strategy nowadays. You can bet 
they've got it worked out in clever demographics. They've 
ltili got those old fashioned brands of soap which are 
proudly part of industrial culture for oonsumers belonging 
to demographic groups still too tied to industrial culture 
to switch. Then there are the younger, better educated ones 
for whom everything from soap to disposable packaging 
II now, by some miraculous perversion of the language, 
'environmentally friendly'. 
Just as in the 60s, every image and slogan which is charged 
with political meaning, arising out of events and struggles 
ad remrded in popular memory, ends up as a jingle. As 
John Berger noted 20 years~· 'revolution' became a way 
to sell panty-hose. 'Freedom was somehow steered away 
&om association with, say, civil rights and oonnected up 
Yla expensive marketing to flared jeans and roll-your-own 
tobacx:o. Greenness will, likewise, bemme a oommodified 
parody of itself, unless green politics keeps up the media 
lideofits game and plays these postmodern games as well, 
If not better, than the enemy. 
I 
The only way to avoid the oomplete co-option of a politi-
cally charged vocabulary and image-repertoire is to keep 
moving, keep making it up, keep varying the themes and 
ltyles, and to avoid any kind of fundamentalism which can 
become doctrinaire or too easily have its more popular 
edga shorn off and appropriated for other uses. The only 
way to do this is to develop the already impressive and 
10phisticated media-politics of the movement even further. 
There are, unfortunately, some obstacles which stand in the 
way of this. 
I don't want to take up organisational issues here. 
Prom the point of view I'm outlining now, the organisa-
tional form of green politics is only part of the picture, and 
In the long run not as important as its media politics. The 
aJltural aspect of green politics seems to me more impor-
tant, but the limitation here is a repetitive adherence to 
well-worn cultural styles. By some historic accident, a 
whole bunch of pop cultural images and styles put in 
clrculation in the late 60s are still being recycled as the 
aJltural wrapping of green politics, as if it were somehow 
II\ authentic expression of that politics. 
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This association of a significant and world-historical move-
ment with a bunch of long-haired pop cliches can only be 
harmful, making green politics an easy target for the media 
monopolies. Why not develop a more diverse and sophis-
ticated linkage of green issues with a much more 
widespread range of cultural styles? Cui tural styles are the 
modes through which loose and fuzzy sets ol otherwise 
quite alienated people make contact and oommunity with 
each other in a postmodem media culture. The more of 
them that green politics can be wrapped in, the better. 
Political struggle these days is connected closely to what 
Stuart Hall has called the struggle for cultural leadership. 
The old forms of progressive political organisation have 
not done terribly well in this struggle in recent times, but 
fortunately there has been a massive influx into the culture 
industries of people both talented and ideologically street-
smart. Now there is no way that the diverse and pluralistic 
impulses of the progressive forres in the culture industries 
are ever going to be organised into any kind of party or 
movement. Those are structural ideas from a pre-media 
age, when organisations had a proportionally far greater 
effect on popular oonsdousness than they do today. In any 
case, being bound to a dogma and obliged to turn up to 
branch meetings strikes most people today as the most 
fundamentally useless form of political action imaginable. 
Thus new ways of tapping into the power, skill and good-
will of the culture industries is a fundamental task for 
making the little skeleton staffs which actually operate 
movements and organisations today effective. It is also the 
only way to make them answerable, via the feedback loop 
of the media, to genuine popular opinion. 
I've said a lot about what the green movement 'should do' 
and 'shouldn't do'. Armchair talk, to be sure, but meant as 
part of a dialogue. Or rather, a transplanting of the dialogue 
thatisalreadywell underwayaboutthefutureofboth 'red' 
and 'green' politics out of the old terrain of organisational 
deckchair-shuffling onto the terrain of mmmunication. I 
don't really care how many new parties and movements 
there are, all with their own offices and meetings and 
standing orders. I wish them all well. What I think matters 
just as much is a politics on another terrain altogether, the 
mediated terrain of postmodem culture. 
Survival in a media ecology poisoned by the holding com-
panies is vital for the green movement, if you will pardon 
the irony. We too might end up extinct if we don't keep 
innovating and diversifying. As much as the postmodern 
might appear distasteful, as an unweloome change of the 
ground rules we were all getting so oomfortable with, one 
can't just argue these changes away. They have to be ron-
fronted in reality, in forms of political action and cultural 
persistence. This is why the Left needs to understand the 
postmodem as a description uf rapidly changing socio-his-
toric dynamics as much as it needs to grasp the significanoo 
of the green movement as a critique of one o1 the fun-
damental aspects of that dynamic gone wrong. 
McKENZIE WARK's essays are due to be published by 
V eno Boob next year. 
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Life after Aunty 
Bureaucrat, broadcaster, writer, feminist-
Wendy McCarthy was one of Australia's most 
prominent women of the 80s. After her unsuc-
cessful make-or-break bid for the chair of the 
ABC, she's taking stock. Kitty Eggerking spoke 
to her in Sydney. 
Wendy McCarthy began her 
working life in the 1960s as a 
teacher. Since then she has been 
a newspaper columnist, film 
consultant, author, and radio 
commentator. She was for six 
years the executive officer of the 
Family Planning Association. 
From 1983 to 1991 she was 
deputy chair of the ABC; she is 
now the executive director of 
the National Trust. 
Do you regret announcing that you 
would leave the ABC if they didn't 
m.Uce you chair? 
No. At least six months before the end 
of my term I'd thought very deeply 
about where I wanted to be in the ABC. 
I decided there were no more challen-
ges in being deputy chair. But I also felt 
it would have been churlish of me not 
to put my hat into the ring to be chair 
since I've spent half my life telling 
other women to do that. It wasn't an 
entirely attractive proposition for me 
because I thought, as chair, it would be 
very difficult to make some of the 
changes I would want to make in the 
ABC. But when I decided to apply I 
had already made my own commit-
ment to changing other parts of my life 
if I got the job. 
The only pain was parting with an 
organisation that I love very dearly, 
like an old friend or lover. There was 
no other regret. If I'd continued as 
deputy there would have been no con-
trol of who else was on the board. I've 
always had a strong view thatthe ABC 
board should represent the interests 
not just of the nation that it serves but 
also of the constituencies it serves. The 
ABC has an extraordinary investment 
in ideas and the arts, so top people on 
the board should be those with a good 
history in music and the arts and in 
ideas. 
In business, they put people in as 
deputy to train them for six to eight 
years. Not only does that give you 
experience, you also get to know the 
culture of the organisation, you get to 
know where the gremlins are and 
where the good fairies are, and you 
find out where the resources are. 
People can't trick you. You have your 
finger on the pulse. I had my finger 
more on the pulse of the ABC than any 
other board I've been on. Butthat' s not 
how appointments happen in the 
public sector. 
Is the ABC becoming management-
heavy, at the expense of bright and 
creative young people? 
I'm not sure about that. I said when I 
stopped being a director in June that I 
wouldn't sit and offer advice from the 
sidelines. But my observation in 
general of creative corporate struc-
tures like the ABC is that there is a 
tendency to manage the creative 
people and be accountable. I've al-
ways taken the view that the ABC at 
its best is in a state of harmonious 
anarchy. Everyone knows what to do 
and how to do it, and you don't need 
a lot of top-heavy management. You 
never have, any more than in a good 
advertising agency. Advertising agen-
cies which corporatised in the last five 
years and went for high-paid, high-
profile management have mostly gone 
broke or have gone back to smaller, 
creative units. 
A paper was recently circulated 
within the ABC on the employment 
and promotion of women in broad-
casting. It seems to have been hotly 
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debated in the ABC; some men have 
been saying .,we're not back to thll 
again are we?'' 
Well, weare, and they'd better remem-
ber it. The greatest contribution that's 
been made to women and broadcast· 
ing recently is Monica Attard. In the 
first place it was an extraordinary 
achievement for Monica to get to Mo .. 
cow-and Heather Ewart to 
Washington-because they are very 
coveted posts. Neither of those 
women would want to acknowledge 
that it had anything to do with their 
gender. They are extremely com-
petent, and it was good that they were 
women. , 
I am surprised at the reaction to that 
internal paper, but then I suppose I 
shouldn't be, because what happens 
when one or two women get up into 
positions is that people sit back and 
say, "they've had their tum now". 
What that piece of research shows II 
the insidious sexism at the junior 
levels where people are struggling to 
make a basic wage in an area that they 
love. They're not necessarily trying to 
be the high flyers. 
The men are threatened, and rightly 
so, because there are an awful lot of 
extremely talented women who want 
to do things that they could never 
have dreamed of in another life. 
They're going to be better than most of 
the men because they're so deteJI. 
mined. There's a strong network of 
women in ABC radio and TV now, and 
they won't let too many people walk 
over them. 
Perhaps they're not so preoccuple4 
with egos and power. 
That's right It's the same with wome 
teachers. They were always interested 
in being extremely good in the cJall. 
room, less interested earlier on Ia 
being principals, but now of coun1a• 
they can see that the reason for 
a principal is to make things 
Issues like child care and 
are cropping up again; it makes 
wonder if anything at all 
changed. Have women made 
gains over the past few years? 
The changes are twofold. The psychic 
culture has changed so that child care 
is now a legitimate topic to discuss 
and take action on. I resented having 
to keep pushing it for a couple of years 
because I was sick of being the only 
woman doing my bit in all-boy 
gatherings. I felt resentful, too, when 
people thought that was all I could do. 
In a way they used that to denigrate 
my other skills. I found that very ir-
ritating and so I gave it a lower 
priority for a year; but I found when I 
ducked it for a year or so the issue 
started to slip away again. 
I decided it was going to happen in the 
ABC, and it has happened in the ABC. 
I decided that I had to pursue it and 
show that it could happen. Otherwise 
I was going to be seen as another waft 
of hot air, a temporary aberration, that 
came across the scene and changed 
nothing. That's the real challenge for 
women who get put into positions of 
influence. It's very hard because 
you're oonstantly denigrated for stick-
ing up for women. 
Does it distress you that in 1991 we 
are once more having an abortion 
debate? 
There's no end to this campaign-
and the approach is much more 
sophisticated this time around be-
cause they're just looking to close 
down the private clinics. Most people 
don't have access to the experienre of 
South Australia or the ACf, where 
abortions are conducted in public 
hospitals. They don't know how hard 
it is to get a pregnancy terminated in a 
public hospital. Many chief executives 
of public hospitals are very much part 
of the Catholic public servire base; 
they're mostly very conservative, 
mostly male and mostly one-industry 
e:xperienred people. They won't make 
things happen in an area that has any-
thing to do with philosophy or morals. 
They just want a straight accounting 
equation. 
The interesting thing is that they think 
they can wear out a generation like 
mine. But I know my daughter will 
fight independently for those rights 
too and I know she'll march with me 
and be proud to do so. I actually think 
my sons would too. It's a less pas-
sionate thing for them but they're 
philosophically on side. 
How much do you think young 
people know of the old fights and 
struggles? 
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I don't think they are greatly aware of 
them, and certainly not aware of the 
passions they aroused. But I don't 
think that matters too much; what 
matters is that they recognise when 
the rights that were won for them are 
threatened and when they must stand 
up and defend them. Their fights will 
be different in degree and style. Child 
care is still a very big issue. When I was 
marching in the streets with my first-
born, I remember women saying 
"you'll be lucky if you get child care in 
her lifetime". At the time I thought 
they were hopeless pessimists, but it's 
true; she's now 23. It will be a very big 
battle for women her age if they decide 
they want to have children. It hasn't 
become much easier at all. 
Do you worry that this generation is 
losing any sense of optimism that it 
might have had? 
The interesting thing is that we are 
now parenting for much longer, in 
order to keep that optimism there. 
That's fine for people like me who 
have good jobs and enough money to 
do it, a house and a reasonably secure 
emotional life. But what about the 
parents for whom life is a struggle, 
who are unemployed and so on? The 
mothers are mostly the ones who have 
to manage all that emotional baggage. 
How they cope under that great stress, 
I don't know. 
Perhaps one problem in Australian 
society is that people feel powerless? 
I grew up believing you couldn't 
change anything, that it was all pre-or-
dained; it came as a great surprise to 
me when I wanted to start changing 
things that the changes happened. 
And I've had a great run at being able 
to change the things that I passionate-
ly wanted to change. Is it just that I've 
been lucky? Is it harder for other 
people? The first two areas where I 
tried to change something were a 
residents' action movement and abor-
tion law reform. And later in 
childbirth education. I suspect that 
people feel not so much powerless as 
over-governed now. That might be the 
difference. I certainly still believe I 
can change things. 
KI'ITY EGGERKING works in the 
Centre for Independent Joumalism at 
the University of Technology, Sydney. 
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Cosmetic Solution 
The Beauty Myth, by Naomi Wolf 
(Chatto and Windus, 1990). 
Reviewed by Annette Corrigan. 
Naomi Wolf has written this 
book, I suspect, with an inten-
tion to shock. If Western women 
were lapsing into complacency 
about the liberation and 
equality they have ac.hieved in 
the past 20 years, Wolf certainly 
provides a jolt of evidence to 
argue that such complacency is 
unwarranted. 
She concedes that second wave 
feminism has been an important 
period of social change in which 
women have experienced greater op-
portunities to escape the constraints of 
domesticity and redefine their roles as 
more than wives, mothers and 
homemakers. However, she argues 
that women's new freedoms have 
been countered by an even more cruel 
and oppressive form of social control 
that has escalated in the last 20 years-
the 'beauty myth'. 
The beauty myth refers to those cul-
tural practices and values which 
designate a woman's appearance as 
the most important criterion by which 
her femininity, her sexuality, and even 
her right to be considered a normal 
and acceptable human being are 
judged. The book exposes the beauty 
myth through a detailed critique of 
those industries whose survival is de-
pendent upon the construction and 
maintenance of the myth: that is, those 
industries concerned with fashion and 
cosmetics, dieting, health and fitness, 
cosmetic surgery, advertising, 
women's magazines, and pornog-
raphy. 
Wolf relentlessly documents the statis-
tics on eating disorders, the economic 
drain of personal maintenance, the 
degrading effects of pornography, the 
mutilation of cosmetic surgery, the im-
agery and propaganda of advertising 
and examples of women's willingness 
to submit themselves to beauty prac-
tices which oonsume precious time, 
energy and money. She paints a pic-
ture of women's entrapment in an op-
pressive and vicious circle of 
self-hatred, anxiety, pain, shame, 
humiliation, hunger, weakness and 
disability. The injustice, she argues, is 
not only that such negative states in 
women are tolerated, oonsidered. nor-
mal or unproblematic and often even 
applauded, as exemplified by the 
frivolous cliche that 'beauty knows no 
pain'; it is that the myth promotes the 
notion that women's access to love, 
attention, warmth, security, sexual 
pleasure, social value, social accep-
tance and self-esteem is contingent 
upon their conformity to certain 
prescribed standards of femininity. 
While women have to t!il7'n their right 
to sexual identity and pleasure, for 
men such things are inalienable rights 
and unquestionable givens. 
Wolf claims the beauty myth has 
grown more potent in the last genera-
tion because women's self-assertion 
and pursuance of their rights have 
brought the sexes "too dose for the 
comfort of the powerful". By seducing 
women into a way of thinking and 
behaving which focuses their atten-
tion on what they look like, the beauty 
myth ultimately reinstates their sub-
servience to men and to cultural 
values that limit female freedom. As 
such, the beauty myth is "a violent 
backlash to feminism" and a means by 
which the sex war is sustained. Instead 
of women's homes existing as their 
prisons, now it is their bodies, a more 
difficult place from which to escape. 
Wolf does not present a very pretty 
samario of the position women are in 
right now. She depicts women as vic-
tims of the beauty myth and as unwit-
ting participants in a form of sodal 
control designed to subordinate them. 
She speaks of ''beauty addiction" and 
builds a picture of women as helpless-
ly and uncontrollably dependent 
upon activities and products which 
offer only false or temporary pleasure 
and fulfilment. The image on the front 
cover is of a naked woman bound in 
shackles-an image which Wolf sus-
tains with use of language such as 
entrapment, imprisonment and 
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enslavement to describe women's 
relation to the beauty myth. 
This imagery is a problem. however, 
because it assumes that all women 111 
on the receiving end of a one-way 
process of oppression, discriminadoa 
and victimisation. Wolf gives no aJDo 
sideration to the ways in which 
women themselves negotiate situlo 
tions where their bodies have bec:oa 
a very significant site of poll tical strut-
gle. For example, when she deals wii 
the topic of eating disorders, she faill 
to engage with what is now quite 1 
substantial feminist bocfy of 
knowledge about the fe5istane2 ud 
rebellion entailed in anorexia nerw& 
Instead, she likens dieting behaviour 
to the trances and chants of bizlnl 
religious cults, suggesting that 
women are brainwashed and lao 
doctrinated into rituals of bodiiJ 
transformation. In so doing, lhl 
reduces the complex nature of eat~Jt 
disorders to instances of "thoughtCXJDo 
trol". 
At the outset, Wolf denies that llw k 
suggesting a oonspiracy theory; howo 
ever, throughout the book she giftl 
the reader every reason to see ao 
spiracy. Sometimes the conspirlllll 
are men in general-but mosdy 
the beauty industries, who cls11d1~• 
lull women into a state of 
satisfaction with their bodies. 
tising is a major culprit in this 
affairs. Wolf claims it leads to obll14111 
sive and irrational responses in 
wise competent and 
women who nevertheless 
"painfully receptive" to what 
magazines tell them. Yet this 
ment ignores a plethora of 
representation and •nl~••~+tVII 
(feminist and otherwise) 
shown this kind of causal ooru:d 
between media images and hUD:JIIII 
haviour to be simplistic and 
minist. To depict women as 
sponges who soak up "'14··-... 
propaganda is to refuse to allow 
agency, or power of negotiation 
female consumer. 
Despite the absences and protlleal 
assumptions and COl1tdusioJt~ 
Jlady Myth, Wolf's book is unique 
1111 therefore valuable for the way in 
which it brings together a host of up-
dated statistics, survey findings, 
reports, medical research and other 
tvidence of women's engagement 
with the beauty industries. For in-
lltance, she draws upon a range of 
IDW'CeS to provide evidence of the ex-
tllllt of eating disorders in America. 
Sbe dtes figures suggesting that one 
million American women each year 
bemme anorexic or bulimic; 150,000 
American women die of anorexia an-
aually; on college campuses up to 20% 
of women students are anorexic; 20% 
of rollege women binge and purge on 
1 regular basis; 5-15% of hospitalised 
IIIOn!xics die in treatment, giving the 
dilease one of the highest fatality rates 
of a mental illness and 40-50% of 
1110rexics never completely recover. 
Until Wolf's book, this type of 
doc:wnentation of evidence from mul-
tiple and various souroos was hard to 
ftDd. 
Despite the picture of gloom and 
doom she paints in the first seven 
chapters, Wolf ends her book on an 
optimistic note in chapter eight. 
Called "Beyond the Beauty Myth", 
here she suggests some ways out of 
this horrible prison in which women 
have been interned. The essence of her 
IOlution is for women to find: "a new 
way to ~,, to refuse to accept that 
beauty is their passport to confidence, 
leXUality and self-regard and to find 
pleasure in themselves and each other 
by appreciating and celebrating the 
multitude of dimensions of their 
female selves. She does not advocate 
that women abandon beauty al-
together but, rather, that they work 
IOWards "a pro-woman definition of 
beauty". This will happen when the 
high stakes which now rest on physi-
mf appearance are removed and that 
practices like adornment simply be-
rome play-something that doesn't 
matter. 
How to get from here to there is not 
dear. Wolf seems to suggest that sub-
fti'Sion will happen when women be-
rome aware of the myth and can 
Gli\Sdously fight the ways it operates 
against them. The conclusion seems 
too optimistic from the arguments 
presented in the previous chapters. 
For if women are as successfully 
duped as she suggests, and given the 
relatively small number she will be 
able to influence through her book, 
then this feminist subversion is look-
ing rather like an uphill battle, if not a 
lost cause already. 
The Beauty Myth is aimed at a popular 
audience and is not intended as an 
academic text which, to some extent, 
accounts for its theoretical limitations. 
However, the problem remains that 
feminist attempts to politicise beauty 
still need a more subtle and sophisti-
cated analysis of the problem than 
Wolf provides. This does not have to 
mean esoteric and inaccessible 
academic prose. Rather, there needs to 
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be an exploration of the possible mul-
tiple interpretations of women's 
engagements with beauty practices; a 
recognition of the ways in which 
women already negotiate and resist 
their sexual objectification and subor-
dination; and a consideration of the 
ambiguities and contradictions in 
women's everyday lives as they ao-
tively take part in the construction of 
femininity and its meanings in con-
temporary Western culture. 
ANNETIE CORRIGAN teadtea in 
humanities at Griffith Univenity. 
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Trending Down 
Fading Loyalties: The 
Australian Labor Party and the 
Working Oass, by Andrew Scott 
(Pluto Press, 1991). Reviewed by 
David McKnight 
At the 1990 election, as its cen-
tenary year approached, the 
ALP received its lowest primary 
vote for 60 years. At the same 
time Labor was undergoing one 
of the most divisive debates of 
the Hawke government: 
whether to privatise a number 
of longstanding public corpora-
tions. 
Within the party there was a crisis both 
of morale and of numbers. Member-
ship has dropped to a very low level 
and complaints that branch members 
are ignored are far from confined to 
traditional critics from the Left. 
Andrew Scott's valuable book charts 
the measurable dimensions of Labor's 
crisis -the trends in membership and 
soda! composition. The author was 
given access to membership records in 
a number of states, and they form the 
foundation of the book. However, 
while the raw figures tell a tale, there 
is also an important context. 
In modem Australia the proportion of 
wage and salary earners within the 
population is greater than ever before. 
But as Scott points out 'They have 
been inaeasingly fragmented along 
the lines of occupation, gender, eth-
nidty and age. Inequalities within 
their ranks and between them and 
welfare redp,ients have been visibly 
multiplied. ' Poverty is now most 
often the consequence offamUy break-
down or age, rather than being a semi-
hfe~ent feature of working-class 
Yet Labor has been grappling for 
decades with problems that have a 
familiar ring-without success. Even 
Arthur Calwell in the 1960s was 
saying that Labor had to accept "new 
hopes, new tastes and new desires", 
and to understand that "the age of the 
affluent society ... poses a whole new 
range of problems for the Labor 
Party''. (Though he went on to state 
that "we view with bewilderment the 
expenditureofvastsumson trivia and 
gimmicks", and to deplore "the 
materialist outlook" which was, "sad 
to say, quite marked among many of 
our young people".) 
Yet it's not all bleak. In spite of the 
continued domination of older Anglo 
men, the 1980s saw women for the first 
time voting Labor in the same propor-
tion as men, while the 1970s had seen 
Labor cement majority support 
among migrants from non-English 
speaking backgrounds. 
But these changes are not generally 
reflected in the kind of people who 
join the ALP. True, women are now a 
higher proportion of members than 
ever before. Yet, as Scott points out, 
this has been connected to a quite 
separate phenomenon: the dispropor-
tionately large number of profes-
sionals and semi-professionals who 
have joined. 
Some migrant groups have joined in 
large numbers, yet often this is con-
nected to branch-stacking exercises 
where family and ethnic community 
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networks are rolled out to provide 
numbers for one faction or other. Be-
cause this is so much a part of the 
traditional Labor culture of patronage 
and favours, it might be argued it is no 
different from the enrolment of blue-
collar party faithful for the same pur-
pose in the 1950s and earlier - but 
somehow I find it more artificial and 
cynical. 
In terms of membership participation 
as a whole Scott paints a picture cl 
protracted decline. While population 
has grown steadily and the Labor vote 
has at least grown in absolute terms, 
party membership ~ been static. 
That is to say, in relative terms it hal 
fallen drastically. 
Scott rightly attributes this in part to a 
decline in the belief that politics and 
parties can make a difference to 
people's lives, and partly in a failure 
on Labor's part to culturally adapt. 
The starkest figures are those (or 
membership by occupation. (The fo1. 
lowing figures are from NSW, but tbe 
Victorian figures are comparable.) In 
1961, the proportion of "professional~ 
and paraprofessionals" in the AI1 
was roughly equivalent to that ill 
sodety as a whole (9% and 7% respeoo 
tively). By 1981, however, the san 
group comprised 24% of ALP znem. 
bershipbutonly10%oftheworkfora. 
In 1961 plant and machine operatort, 
drivers and labourers comprised 231 
of Labor's membership, and 16~ ~ 
the workforce; in 1981 the respectiw 
figures were 11% and 14%. Tbe 
proportion of tradespeople in l.1bor 
membership likewise more thu 
halved between 1961 and 1981 (231 
and 10%), while the proportion in tbl 
workforce fell only marginally (121111 
10%). At the same time the blue-mlllr 
membership of the ALP has ap4 
steadily. 
The pattern among migrant memt.l 
is perhaps less gloomy. In 1961 cm1J 
7% of members in NSW sampled 1111 
recognisably non Anglo-Celtic 8IIIJ 
names; by 1981 the figure had rileD If 
14% in NSW and by 1986 to 221 i1 
Victoria. However, as Scott n'*' 
"this is less spectacular than tlli 
6up in the electorate at large", 
Wile "few of the ALP members from 
MD-English speaking backgrounds 
Ia drawn from manual jobs where 
llligrant men and women are most 
lbly to be found". 
1111 worst possible interpretation of 
dille figures is that "trendies" have 
driven "workers'' out of the ALP. Yet, 
• Scott's research shows the major 
._in blue collar membership was in 
.. 1950s and 1960s, while the new 
white c:nllar ronstituency only really 
aerged in the late 1960s with the as-
cension of Whitlam, and the rise of the 
anti-Vietnam War movement 
Scott draws conclusions from this re-
search which I find sensible but some-
how inadequate. They include 
opposition to attempts to break the 
union nexus, support for the 
democratisation of structures and the 
creation of special interest branches, 
and a healthy sceptidsm about large-
scale union amalgamations. Yet solu-
tions will not necessarily be found 
simply by improving the partidpation 
of Labor's traditional constituendes 
-a point which Scott seems to accept, 
but which he never follows through. 
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There is a crisis of what Labor stands 
for, as well as of what it means in 
practical political terms to stand for a 
range of progressive values. Part of the 
solution lies in analysing why it is that 
labor's declining primary vote has 
not simply swung over the conserva-
tive parties. Rather it has been ex-
pressed in support for independents 
and the Democrats. But teasing out the 
scope of this phenomenon is under-
standably beyond the scope of Fllding 
LoyaltUs -as it is of this review .
DAVID McKNIGHT is a rnurcher for 
ABC TV's Four Corners. 
Fear of Women 
Amongst Women by fohn Mc-
Gtlhern (Faber and Faber 1990). 
Reviewed by Jane Sutton. 
Amongst Women, shortlisted for the 
Booker Prize in 1990, is a disturbing 
aovel. The opening descriptions of the 
Jftpllrations fpr Monaghan Day at the 
Moran household in Broadmeadow, 
In Irish village, suggest a sweeping 
tale of political and family life, or a 
detailed exploration of Irish village 
life will follow. But Amongst Women is 
actually a telling and claustrophobic 
lltudy of a patriarch and the emotional 
and .Physical violence he inflicts on his 
family. 
John M<Glhem is a writer interested 
in the dynamics of power and control 
between men and women. Amongst 
Women is at its most powerful and 
disturbing in its exploration of these 
dynamics. 
Moran, the central figure, is an Irish 
Republican and had been a figure in 
the IRA However, the connection be-
tween the fierce emotional tensions of 
family life and the Irish situation pro-
vide a background but not the sinister 
focus of the book. 
The women of the title are Moran's 
new wife, Rose, and his daughters 
Mona, Sheila and Maggie. Moran's 
mood swings and physical violence 
towards his sons keep the women in a 
constant state of fear. 
The rituals of the Catholic religion, 
such as the saying of Grace and the 
Rosary at times of the day dictated by 
him are the ways in which Moran ex-
erts his control over the women. 
The reader is given a disturbing sense 
of the psychic as well as physical space 
in which Moran, his wife and 
daughters live, and the means by 
which Moran makes the house his 
domain. Not only does he create the 
sense of time by which they measure 
their lives by the use of the Catholic 
ritual; he also constructs and controls 
the space in which they live. 
Following a fight with Moran, Rose 
retreats to the bedroom and closes the 
door. Moran insists his daughters 
open it He proceeds to declaim the 
Rosary in his wife's hearing, thus 
negating her separate existence out-
side his mental space. 
The title, Amongst Women, suggests 
that Moran may only exist inside the 
definition of the group of women 
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which makes up his family. Moran's 
violence is a response to his fear of 
female power as described through 
his son Michael's first sexual ex-
perience. When Michael's girlfriend 
Nell is: 
... ready for her own 
pleasure ... such was her strength that 
he was frightened. She shouted, 
seized him roughly at the hips and 
forced him to move. 
Michael can't "comprehend" Nell's 
behaviour. It is Moran's fear of being 
engulfed by a femaleness he cannot 
comprehend that brings him to his 
hideous use of emotional and physical 
violence within his family. 
Amongst Women is a brave and dis-
turbing novel. Brave to deal with the 
difficult issue of the dynamics of 
violence and power within a family, 
and disturbing because I am not con-
vinced the author is aware of the fis-
sures in his text which vent this terror 
and fear of women through the ex-
ploration of the violence and control 
of the central character of Moran. 
JANE SUlTON is a Sydney mel.ance 
writer. 
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Traffic Snarls 
Gridlock, by Ben Elton (Mac-
donald, 1991). Reviewed by Adam 
Kerez.sy. 
It was probably the television series 
The Young Ones which first gave 
Australians a taste of Ben Elton's 
humour. Who can forget the episode 
when Neil was sneezing great gobs of 
green goo into plastic garbage bags 
which the others had affixed to his 
head? It was a zany show featuring 
exaggerated characters and more 
blatant, uninhibited one-liners than 
most of us have had sexual inter· 
course. It was addictive, too, because 
beneath all the over-the-top gags ran 
an undercurrent of truth. We all recog-
nised little bits of ourselves in Rile, 
Mike, Vivian and Neil, and those who 
were willing to recognise the most no 
doubt laughed the loudest 
IDton's second novel, Gridlock, has, in 
common with all his previous wo~ 
an \U\canny understanding of human 
weaknesses and an ability to wring 
them for all they are worth. It is the 
story of a spastic scientist, a cripple, a 
bum-licking politician, the bigwigs of 
the American auto industry and, in a 
nutshell, it is about cars. Lots of cars. 
Anybody who has spent any time in a 
traffic jam will know that the practice 
of sitting, alone, in a car, behind count-
less other cars all going to roughly the 
same place and burning up kilolitres 
of fossil fuels in the process is an ab-
surd way to conduct one's life, and 
mton pushes the idiotic mentality of 
his fellow humans to hitherto un-
known extremes. Geoffrey Peason, the 
spastic scientist-obviously with 
more of a finger on the pulse than the 
rest of the human population-in-
vents an engine which runs on 
hydrogen: an engine which could 
change the oourse of history. The only 
problem with his invention is that 
quite a lot of people--mainly those 
growing fat on the profits of oil, steel 
and all the other bits which make up 
car&-would dearly love to see both 
Geoffrey and his ideas bum eternally 
in hell. 
The many sub-plots range from Geof-
frey trying unsuccessfully to have it 
off with his crippled friend Deborah, 
to MP Digby Parkhurst's attempts to 
come to terms with having his 
homosexuality scrawled all over the 
Sunday papers. Elton has always got 
a lot of mileage out of grotty little 
people trying to plook each other, and 
Gridlock continues this tradition. In 
other words, don't be put off if you 
don't like the idea of a hilarious book 
about cars-the hilarity has long 
enough tentacles to cover pretty well 
everything. 
Uke every good thriller, Gridlock has 
plenty of murders, weaponry and ac-
tion to keep the punters amused. 
Geoffrey's plans change hands many 
times in the 360-page battle. The last 
chase scene (which involves an in· 
jured man, a pistol and a mad New 
Yorker in a wheelchair) is played out 
against the backdrop of a huge grid· 
lock which cripples Londoners, their 
cars and London itself for three days. 
Elton's comic wizardry makes 
Gridlock an entertaining read but, as 
with all good humdur, it is the 
author's concerns regardin~ the more 
serious aspects of his subJect which 
tum it into cutting satire. Nowadays 
in a position where he could make a 
fortune simply by producing 
autographed toilet rolls, Elton has in-
stead chosen to use his powerful im-
agination to again produce an 
intricate and thoroughly entertaining 
story. H you read it and find yourseiJ 
scratching your head and thinking, 
"Why the hell are we all such fools?" 
or something similar, you're not the 
only one. 
ADAM KEREZSY ia a Sydney 
petrol-pump attmdanL 
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CORRECT 
LINE 
COOKING 
How to Improvise 
It has been brought to my attention 
by my colleagues at the Improvisa-
tion Standards Board, Canberra 
llegio~ that all is not well in terms 
of spontaneous and creative cook-
Ing. People generally are not very 
good at having fun in the kitchen 
and producing something even 
vaguely edible at the same time. It is 
In response to this appalling state of 
affairs that the ISB has produced its 
informative booklet Recipes for Im-
provisation which, if followed 
precisely, will result in the 
manufacture of satisfying and total-
ly spur-of-the-moment meals. Itis to 
this indispensable booklet that I 
now tum in order to teach you the 
proper way to do things. Sit up and 
pay attention. 
llule One 
If you want to be the sort of person 
who can throw together a meal at 
short notice, you must be well-
prepared. Just as no self-respecting 
sleazebucket ventures out without a 
condom in his or her possession 
when feeling adventurous, spon-
taneity requires organisation. Things 
must be to hand-and preferably to 
eye as well. A well-organised cook 
will have basics such as oil, rice or 
pasta visible or at least not hidden 
away at the back of a cupboard. 
Fresh herbs should proclaim their 
freshness to the kitchen and potential 
cook. If kept in the refrigerator they 
are likely to end up as oompost. Such 
things are ready to use without 
preparation, whereas jars of dry 
legumes generally require overnight 
soaking and boiling for an hour or 
more. My suspicion is that legumes 
are solely responsible for the exist-
ence of fast food outlets. They look 
nice in jars but require too much in-
telligence to use properly. Writing 
"soak butterbeans" in one's filofax is 
perhaps a bit excessive-although it 
could perhaps be combined with the 
types of odd little symbols women 
use to keep tabs on the menstrual 
cycle. But don't get them mixed up, 
ladies. I find that sitting in a bath 
overnight does very little for my 
wellbeing and wrinkles up my skin. 
Rule Two 
"Let's start at the very beginning-
that's a very good place to start." (The 
Sound of Music) Don't be too am-
bitious if you are a relatively inex-
perienced cook. This does not mean 
that you need a five-year plan which 
starts with boiling eggs and ends 
with doing nasty things with truffles. 
We all know that such overweening 
schemes are doomed to failure. How-
ever, successful spontaneity does re-
quire some humility, even if I say so 
myself. If you are a bit frightened of 
cooking without a recipe, start by 
changing one or two details in some-
thing you know well, and soon you'll 
find that you are less reliant on the 
written word. 
This rule about playing things safe 
has several sub-rules, according to 
the Improvisation Standards Board. 
Don't try to make sweet and sour 
anything when drunk. Don't get 
upset if your meal is not tasting as 
good as you thought it would. Don't 
be too heavy-handed with dried 
herbs in an attempt to make some-
thing taste like it was made with fresh 
herbs. Restraint is as important as 
generosity, and I speak as one who 
has eaten extra syrupy pears served 
with barbecued steak 11nd mustard as 
an unfortunate attempt to replicate a 
meal the cook had at a restaurant. 
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Rule Three 
Uvewithsomeoneelsewhoisagood 
cook, so that no one has to grind out 
meals when they don't want to. 
Drudgery is anathema to good food. 
Rule Four 
Uve near a good takeaway; it relieves 
the tension. 
Rule Five 
The key to the great door of creativity 
is Mascarpone cheese. I just dis-
covered it the other day and finally 
understand what was missing in my 
pathetically inadequate life. Mascar-
pone cheese is a near liquid, pale and 
creamy cheese to which I have 
decided to devote the rest of my life. 
I defy anyone to stand unmanned in 
the kitchen with a packet of Mascar-
pone cheese at his or her disposal. Its 
uses are myriad, but the following 
are laid down as legitimate by the 
Improvisation Standards Board (Fun 
Guidance Secretariat), and are there-
fore able to be attempted without fill-
ing in Form 195. 
• Combine it with melted blue cheese 
over a low heat to make an instant 
pasta sau~. Sprinkle with parsley 
before servmg. 
• Mix it with eggs and honey and 
vanilla and pour over sliced apples in 
a pie flan to make a custard. Cook in 
oven until set. 
• Use as a sandwich spread, ideally 
with sun-dried tomatoes. 
• Use in casseroles along with rice 
and pre-cooked vegetables. 
The secret is now out and you will be 
able to create heavenly meals in an 
instant. Your fame as a cook will 
spread. People will stop preparing 
meals for you because they think you 
will sneer at their slapdash ways. Per-
haps you will. Armed with Mascar-
pone cheese you will become an artist 
of the kitchen and never again reach 
for those dubious microwave meals. 
Copies of Recipes for Improuisation and 
the lSB' s new and misleading publi-
cation 1001 Mort Ways to HJrve Fun in 
Omberr11 can be obtained by writing 
to them. I'll be at home playing with 
my cheese. 
Penelope Cottier. 
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DEAR DR 
HARTMAN 
Bunsen Burner 
Darwinism 
Public sector teachers across 
Australia are experiencing 
profound psycho-sexual malfunc-
tion on a mass scale. 
I had a typical case last week. This 
teacher lassie was brought into my 
clinic on a stretcher. As soon as she 
saw me, she wailed, "Working in 
public schools is like working in a 
barber's shop. It's cuts, cuts, cuts-
all the time!" 
Budget constraints had forced the 
principal at her school to ration the 
allocation of chalk to one box per 
teacher, per term. When my patient 
got this 'chalk memo', she began to 
act like a furtive drug smuggler. 
She started to hide pieces of chalk 
in little money belts strapped to her 
body so that other teachers could 
not find iL When she began to con-
ceal the chalk in small plastic bags 
within her body cavities, she was 
brought to my clinic. 
Patients, with due respect to the 
disability lobby's language policy, 
it must be said that blind Freddy 
can see that our state school system 
cannot cope with the current num-
ber of students. There just aren't 
enough books, chairs and exam 
papers to go.round. 
Of course, educational resources 
aren't absolutely essential for effec-
tive learning. There are plenty of 
eminent professors in independent 
think-tanks, funded from uniden-
tified private sources, who'll argue 
that a poor, black ldd who wants to 
learn and who is a 'trier', will do 
well sitting under a gum tree with 
a correspondence course and a 
copy of the Old Testament. 
I respect these views. I respect any 
laddie or lassie who wears the same 
old school tie that I do and who skis 
at the same resorts. These are objec-
tive, scientific views that can be 
trusted. 
However, while poor kids may do 
well learning under trees, the 
legitimate needs of the forestry in-
dustries are so pressing we just 
can't guarantee that there'll be 
enough trees to put them under in 
the twentyfirst century. 
Rational economic plannipg 
demands that we simply have to 
cull the kids-just like we do on the 
goat farm I established on the ad-
vice of my accountant, right down 
the road from my old macadamia 
nut farm. Scarce educational 
resources must only be invested in 
children who will pay dividends 
for the national shareholders. Tax 
funded equipment cannot be 
wasted on born losers. 
We must take a Darwinian ap-
proach to education. Invest in the 
winners and abandon the losers to 
their evolutionary fate. The fittest 
will survive. Medical faculties have 
taken this approach for years-and 
look what it has done for the medi-
cal profession. 
Let's not shilly-shally around. This 
culling can start in kindeigarten. 
There is a simple way to sift out the 
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dinosaurs from the species with a 
future. 
The best indicator of a child's 
educational potential is the parents' 
choice of newspaper. If a child's 
parentssubscribetotheJnd~mf 
Monthly and the Financial Review, 
give them a fast tracked path to 
university entrance and a guaran-
teed place in an MBA course. 
If the parents read a paper pitched 
at a reading age of ten, with a big· 
breasted woman on page three, let 
the child play a lot of sport at school 
and get your tailor to nplke them up 
a wardrobe of clothes with a lot of 
blue collars. 
If a child's parents read nothing ex· 
cept the 1V guide to find out when 
Hinch is on, then the child should 
be allowed to smoke in the school 
toilets until it's old enough to be 
allocated a voluntary tutor. The 
tutor will teach them a subject that 
used to be called 'English' but Is 
now called 'literacy'. 
For older students in our crowded 
public high schools, here is another 
culling technique. Take the 
teenagers into the science 
laboratory and offer basic instruc-
tion in the use of bunsen bumere 
and beakers. Then leave them unat-
tended. 
If a student uses the equipment 10 
make bright colours and bad 
smells, as instructed, give them a 
ticket to the Higher School Certifi. 
cate and a life of work beyond. 
But if a student uses the bunss 
burner to light a joint and make I 
slice of toast, then 'Newstart' is the 
euphemism for them in the 
economically rationa11990s. 
Send your problems to Dr 
Hartman's secretary, Julit 
McCrossin, cl- ALR. 
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Colllmunism is dead 
Boris grabs 
the levers 
Gorbachev kicks away 
the remaining props 
Sydney Morning Herald, 26.8.91 
• THE AUSTRALIAN GORU(H(V QUIYS PARTY TflL ', CFN.RAl (Q'w'IMITT(f TO DI~IAN - ----- -
DEATH OF COMMUNISM 
Australian, 26.8.91 
If you want to find out what forward-looking people on the Left are thinking, before it 
enters the newspapers, ALR is your only choice. 
To subscribe to ALR: 
TO SUBSCRIBE you'll need to send us your name and address. RATES: for one year (11 issues): $35 individuals, $32 concession (students, pensioners, 
unemployed), $45 institutions. For two years: $62 individuals, $54 concession, $75 instMons. Supporting subscriptions (to help fund our growth): $60 
one)'ear, $100 two years. PAYMENT: Please endose payment by cheque, money order, Bankcard or Mastercard. W~h credit card orders, please 
indude holder's name, card no. and expiry date. Post to ALR Subs, Freepost 28, PO Box A247, Sydney South, NSW 2000 (no stamp needed if posted 
in Australia). Overseas rates on request. 
I I Newsmaking controversy. Agenda-setting debates. 
And a darned good read. 
The 
CORNSTALK 
BOOKSHOP 
Recycling good second-hand 
books 
GLEBE 
112 Glebe Point Rd 
Sydney 
Ph: (02) 660 4889 
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